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Case No. 20130432-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

ABISAI MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS,
ti

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his convictions for two counts of controlled substance
possession, third degree felonies, Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(b)(ii); and one
count each of possession of drug paraphernalia, Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5; and
driving with a controlled substance in the body, Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-517;
both class B misdemeanors. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2014) .

•

INTRODUCTION
After stopping Defendant for a license plate violation, a highly-trained
and experienced UHP Trooper observed that Defendant's fast and jittery speech
and movements were inconsistent with typical nervousness and more likely
explained by controlled substance use.

The Trooper also learned that

Defendant had a history of drug possession. Based on these facts, the Trooper
conducted field sobriety tests which Defendant failed. The Trooper discovered
drugs, paraphernalia, and knives in Defendant's car and THC metabolite in
Defendant's blood.

Trial counsel unsuccessfully moved to suppress this

evidence. Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective in litigating that
motion.
During jury selection, the trial court questioned individual jurors in

'

chambers without Defendant. Defendant argues that his counsel should have
objected to this procedure and should have removed three jurors, including a

'

retired highway patrol trooper.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was trial counsel ineffective during jury selection?

2.

Was trial counsel ineffective in litigating the motion to suppress?

'

Standard of Review for issues 1-2. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim
initially raised on appeal presents a question of law. State v. Beckering, 2015 UT
App 53, 118, 346 P.3d 672.
3.

After trial, the trial court sua sponte raised issues of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel and appointed Defendant conflict counsel to address
them. Conflict counsel filed a document captioned "Amicus Brief," arguing
that trial counsel performed adequately.
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Did the trial court plainly err m appointing conflict counsel for
,

Defendant?

Standard of Review. Plain error is obvious, prejudicial error. See id. ,I19.
4.

The trial court entered Defendant's conviction on Count II as a

third degree felony even though the prosecutor had amended Count II to a class
B misdemeanor.
Should this Court remand to allow the trial court to correct this clerical
error?

Standard of Review. None applies.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

"

No interpretation of any constitutional provision, statute, or rule is
required.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Facts.

UHP Trooper John Sheets stopped Defendant's car on I-15 after noticing
that Defendant's California license plate was missing a required sticker
showing the registration month. R436:3-4;R440:43-45; State's Exhibit (SE) #7.
The car's registration, which was valid, also showed that the year sticker on
Defendant's plate was invalid. R436:6-8. For identification, Defendant could
produce only an expired Colorado driver's license. R436:6-8.

-3-

While discussing Defendant's license and registration, Sheets observed
that Defendant was "a little bit jittery," "had jittery ... fast speech," and was
"bouncing around a little bit."

R436:8-9.

1

In Sheets' experience of having

stopped "thousands of cars," Defendant's behavior was inconsistent with

•

typical "nervousness." R436:9. Rather, it suggested that Defendant "was on
some type of stimulant." R436:8-9;R440:56.
When he stopped Defendant in June 2010, Sheets had been an officer for
about 20 years and on UHP's drug interdiction squad for about 9 years. R436:2.
Sheets had taken several classes on drug recognition, and had been a certified

'

Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) for about 6 years, and a certified DRE instructor

•

for about 4 years. R436:2,13.
Sheets returned to his car to check Defendant's license, registration, and
criminal history. R436:8. He learned that the car had been properly registered
to Defendant about three months earlier and that Defendant had been issued a
valid Utah driver's license. R436:6,8. He also learned that Defendant had a
history of drug offenses. R436:8;R440:48-49. Defendant had a 2001 charge for
conh·olled substance possession; a felony conviction for controlled substance
possession entered later in 2001; a 2006 felony charge for controlled substance
possession; and a 2007 probation violation for again possessing controlled

-4-
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substances.
,

R460:3-5.

This history "heightened" Sheets' "suspicions" that

Defendant was under the influence of drugs. R436:8.
Sheets administered field sobriety tests which Defendant failed. R436:12-

,

15. On the eye gaze test, Defendant demonstrated a "lack of convergence in

both eyes," which suggested marijuana use. R436:12;R440:58-60. Defendant
demonstrated a " [o ]ne inch . . . sway" on the Rhomberg test.

R436:13.

Defendant also demonstrated "eyelid tremors," which indicates "drug use."
R436:14. On the walk and turn test, Defendant raised his arms on his third step

and did not turn properly. R436:14. On the one-leg stand test, Defendant had a
"swaying balance." R436:14. Defendant's pulse was elevated and he also had

"

"red eyed conjunctiva," which indicates marijuana use. R436:14.
Before administering these tests, Sheets asked Defendant if he had any
weapons; Defendant replied that he had two knives.

R436:9-11.

Because

Defendant had a felony conviction, Sheets concluded that Defendant could not
possess the knives. R436:9-10,15.
Sheets arrested Defendant based on the field sobriety tests and his
possessing the knives. R436:14-15. Sheets searched Defendant's car and found:
(a) two knives; (b) a hand grenade-shaped n1arijuana grinder that smelled of
raw marijuana and had greenish residue; (c) a hand grenade-shaped lighter; (d)
a "bindle" of methamphetamine; (e) three cellophane-wrapped hydrocodone or
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Lortab pills; (f) seven cellophane-wrapped prescription anti-seizure medication
pills; (g) two glass pipes, one with burnt residue; (h) a safety pin with residue;
and (i) three empty "twists" made from plastic bag pieces with burned ends
which resembled typical drug packaging. R435:6-11;R436:18-19;R440:66-83.
Defendant refused to submit to a urine test because he admitted having
smoked marijuana.

R436:21.

He claimed to have a California "medical

marijuana card." R436:29;R440:90. Sheets obtained a warrant for a blood draw.
R436:23. Defendant's blood tested positive for a tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)
metabolite, marijuana's primary metabolite. R440:89; SE #3.

Defendant admits using marijuana
At trial, Defendant admitted using marijuana in California two days
before the stop. R440:134. He also admitted that the marijuana grinder and
lighter were his. R440:137,143. Defendant claimed he had obtained a California
medical marijuana permit after injuring his back. R440:131-33,137.
Defendant also admitted that the knives were his. R440:143. He said he
used them at his job to cut open pallets of cardboard. R440:145.
Defendant claimed to know nothing about the other drugs and
paraphernalia in his car. R440:137-38,143-44. He said that he purchased the car
"[a]bout" a month before the stop but had never cleaned it. R440:138,142. He
said he registered the car "about a couple of days" after buying it. R44O:143.

-6-
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Defendant actually registered his car in March 2010, three months before the
stop. R440:148.
B.

Summary of proceedings.

The State charged Defendant with:
Count I- possession of methamphetamine, a third degree
felony;
Count II- possession of hydrocodone, a third degree felony;
Count III- possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person, a class A misdemeanor;
Count IV - driving with a measurable controlled substance in
the body, a class B misdemeanor;
Count V -possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor; and
Count VI-possession of a controlled substance without a
valid prescription, a class B misdemeanor.
R2-1. At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor moved to amend Count

II (hydrocodone possession) to a class B misdemeanor after Trooper Sheets
testified that the hydrocodone pills were Lortab, a schedule III substance.
R2,27;R435:10. The trial court granted the motion.

1

R2,27;R435:10. The State

dismissed Count VI before trial. R147.

1

Before the preliminary hearing, the State filed an amended information
correcting Defendant's last name, but not changing the original charges. Rl211. The trial court a1nended Count II to a class B misdemeanor only on the
original Information. R2, 12.
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At his arraignment, Defendant initially pied guilty to Count I
(methamphetamine possession), but when his counsel interjected, Defendant

'

changed his plea to not guilty on all charges. R435:24.

,

The motion to suppress
Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in his car
and blood, arguing that the initial search violated his constitutional rights. R3332. No memorandum accompanied the motion. The trial court held a hearing
on the motion and Trooper Sheets testified and was cross-examined.
R35;R436:l-37.

Trial counsel had not requested, and therefore had not

'

reviewed, Sheets' dash-cam video before the hearing. R436:34-35. The trial

•

court therefore did not review that video during the hearing. R436:34-35.
Following the hearing, the trial court set a briefing schedule on the
motion.

R35. Trial counsel never filed a supporting memorandum, despite

requesting and receiving an extension to do so.

R40-37.

The State filed a

memorandum opposing the motion. R56-41. The trial court denied the motion
without explanation. R57.
Trial counsel moved to set aside that order and for additional time to file
a supporting 1nemorandmn. R83. The trial court granted the request.

R83.

Rather than filing a memorandum, however, trial counsel filed a transcript of
the preliminary hearing and a notice to submit the suppression motion for

-8-
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decision. R82-57,85. The trial court thereafter reinstated its prior order denying
the suppression motion, noting that Defendant had never filed a supporting
memorandum. R86.

"

Two days before trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss, arguing that the
dash-cam video demonstrated that there was "no basis" for the stop.

R143.

According to him, the video showed that Sheets did not inspect Defendant's
license plate until after stopping him.

R143-42.

The trial court denied the

motion. R440:124-25.

The trial
Jurors Paul Mangelson, Carolyn Sachra, and Lucy Jones were questioned
in chambers and sat on the jury. Br.Aplt. 29-30. Defendant was not present
during the in-chambers questioning. R431,428. The argument section below
contains additional detail about jury selection.
The jury convicted Defendant of Counts I, II, IV, and V.
58;R440:206-07.

R263-

The jury acquitted on Count III (dangerous weapon

possession). R263-58;R440:206-07.

,

Post-trial proceedings
After trial, the trial court notified the parties that it was sua sponte
considering granting a new trial based on trial counsel's possible ineffective
assistance. R268-67. The court was concerned that trial counsel did not (1) "file

-9-

any memorandum following an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to
suppress"; or (2)

11

challenge or remove a potentially biased juror."

Although the court stated that the trial testimony presented

II

R268.

'

at least an

arguable basis to have pursued defendant's motion to suppress," the court did
not identify any specific testimony.

R268.

On the juror issue, the court

expressed concern that trial counsel did not remove a former highway
patrolman. R268. The court identified no concern with any other juror. R268.

'

The court later withdrew the jury selection issue. R285 n.l;R441:2;442:4,7-8.
After

appointing

Defendant

conflict

counsel

and

receiving

a

'

memorandum from that attorney, the trial court withdrew its remaining
concern about litigation of the suppression motion. R274,286-78;R441:6;R442:89.

The trial court sentenced Defendant to 0-5 years in prison on Counts I
and II, and 6 months in jail on Counts IV and V, all to run concurrently.
R442:13-14. The trial court suspended those sentences and placed Defendant on

•
24 months' probation on several conditions, including that he serve 30 days in
jail with credit for 15 days served and pay various fines and fees.
93;R442:13-14.

R295-

The court stayed the sentence pending a new h·ial motion.

'

R442:16.
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,
Trial counsel filed a motion for new trial arguing that Trooper Sheets

•

changed his testimony about the reason for the stop. R297-96;R393;R443:l. The
motion did not specify how the testimony changed, but rather included

,

unofficial transcripts of the preliminary hearing, suppression hearing, and trial.
R360-296.

At the new trial motion hearing, trial counsel argued that Trooper Sheets
conducted a "profile stop" and did not discover the license plate violation until
after the stop. R443:4. The trial court denied the motion without elaborating.
R394. Defendant timely appeals. R396.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective during jury voir dire
because he did not: (1) ensure that Defendant was present during in-chambers
questioning of individual prospective jurors; and (2) remove Jurors Mangelson,
Jones, and Sachra. Defendant's claims fail out the outset because he relies on
the wrong prejudice standard. Defendant does not assert that a biased juror
actually sat.
Defendant does argue that Juror Sachra expressed bias, but he has not
shown that her single, equivocal statement that a person who has drugs in their
car "is probably guilty," established actual bias. Nor has Defendant shown that

-11-

follow-up questioning did not dispel any potential bias. The jury's acquittal on
I

count III also demonstrates that no juror was actually biased.
Alternatively, Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that
his counsel's jury selection decisions were strategic.
chambers questioning is inaudible.

The record of the in-

Defendant attempted to reconstruct the

record with declarations from his trial counsel and the prosecutor.
provides no declaration himself.

But he

The record that he does provide does not

'

rebut the presumption of effective assistance.
Defendant provides no non-speculative evidence that he and his counsel

•

did not discuss the in-chambers questioning or that Defendant did not waive
his presence. Counsel's inability to recall such discussions does not establish
that the discussions and waiver did not occur.
Nor has Defendant rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel's

I

jury selection decisions were strategic. He has not shown that his counsel was
inattentive or indifferent to any juror, or that a juror expressed bias so strongly
that all reasonable attorneys would have removed that juror. Juror Sachra did
not express actual bias. And Defendant has not shown that Juror Jones' alleged
reservations about serving as a juror related to potential bias, as opposed to
concerns about her health or employment.
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,
Nor has Defendant shown that his counsel lacked any plausible reason
for keeping Juror Mangelson.

Although Juror Mangelson was a retired

highway patrol trooper, he unequivocally affirmed that he would not give
;

Trooper Sheets' testimony more weight and that he would decide the case
based on the evidence and the law. Trial counsel had also worked with Juror
Mangelson when counsel was a prosecutor, and counsel believed that Juror
Mangelson would be sympathetic to Defendant based on what he perceived to
be Trooper Sheets' questionable tactics. This was a legitimate reason not to
remove Juror Mangelson that arguably proved partially successful, because the
jury acquitted Defendant on one count.

"

II. Defendant faults his trial counsel for not raising additional arguments
in the suppression motion. Defendant now asserts that Trooper Sheets lacked
reasonable suspicion to extend the stop because: (1) the dash-cam video of the
stop refuted Sheets' observations of Defendant's speech and manner; (2)
Defendant's criminal history of controlled substance possession was too stale;
and (3) Sheets' trial testimony undermined his suppression hearing testimony.
Trooper Sheets was a highly-trained and experienced Drug Recognition
Expert who observed that Defendant's speech and behavior was fast and jittery
and not typical of normal nervousness. He also he learned that Defendant had
long a history of controlled substance possession. Defendant also could not
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4

produce a valid driver's license. The constellation of these factors established

,

reasonable suspicion to extend the stop.
The dash-cam video does not refute Sheets' observations because, in the
less-than-two minute portion capturing Defendant's initial interactions with
Sheets,

Defendant's speech and

movements

are mostly indiscernible.

Defendant's behavior outside the car is largely irrelevant because it occurs after
Sheets decided to extend the stop, and it is not necessarily indicative of
Defendant's earlier behavior. In any event, Defendant failed the field sobriety

•

tests.
Nor is Defendant's criminal history too stale to support reasonable
suspicion. Defendant's criminal history showed a long and recurring pattern of

I

controlled substance possession.
Finally, although Defendant alleges that Sheets' testimony materially

'

changed between the suppression hearing and trial, trial counsel could not have
relied on that fact in litigating a pre-trial motion to suppress. Regardless, there
is no material difference between descriptions of Defendant's speech as "fast"
and "jittery," and "rapid."

-

Ad while Sheets' testimony about how he first

encountered Defendant's car changed from the suppression hearing to the trial,

'

that change would affect only the validity of the initial stop, which Defendant

'

does not challenge.

-14-

III. Defendant argues that when the trial court sua sponte raised issues
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, it plainly erred by not appointing
independent, conflict counsel to represent Defendant. But that is exactly what
the trial court did. The fact that conflict counsel viewed himself as only a friend
to the court is an issue of counsel, not trial court error. Regardless, Defendant
could not show that his conflict counsel was ineffective because he has not

"

shown that conflict counsel could have proven that his trial counsel was
ineffective.
IV. Defendant's sentence contains a clerical error because it records his

conviction on Count II (hydrocodone possession) as a third degree felony, even
though the prosecutor had amended that charge to a class B misdemeanor.
Clerical errors are correctable at any time. This Court should thus remand for
the limited purpose of correcting the error.

ARGUMENT

I.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT REBUTTED THE STRONG PRESUMPTION THAT
HIS COUNSEL PERFORMED EFFECTIVELY DURING JURY SELECTION

During jury selection, the trial court and counsel individually questioned
several potential jurors in chambers. R416-412,431-28. Defendant argues that
because he was "not allowed to attend or to participate" in this in-cha1nbers
ill

questioning, he was "denied the opportunity to be present at a critical stage" of
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4

his trial. Br.Aplt. 16-17. Because he did not raise this issue below, Defendant
argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not insisting that Defendant be
present.

Br.Aplt. 17, 21.

'

Defendant further contends that his counsel was

ineffective for not removing three jurors who were questioned in chambers.
Br.Aplt. 21-37.
After the prospective jurors completed a questionnaire, the trial court
questioned them in open court. R189,461;R440:1-21. The court then explained
that it would "meet with counsel in my chambers" to question prospective
jurors individually. R440:21.
The trial court questioned several jurors in chambers. R416-412,431-28.
The record of the in-chambers questioning is unintelligible, however, because

•

the courtroom microphone was left on during the questioning. R440:22. After
the in-chambers questioning, counsel passed the panel for cause and made
peremptory challenges in open court. R412,431;R440:22-24.
In light of the missing record, Defendant obtained "declarations" from

•

his trial counsel and the prosecutor. R417-08,432-24. These were prepared over
fifteen 1nonths after trial. R424(a),410. Trial counsel's declaration states that
Defendant was not present during the in-chambers questioning and "was not
invited in chambers." R431,428. Defendant concedes that his "counsel failed to
object" to Defendant's absence. Br.Aplt. 17.
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'

•
Jurors Paul Mangelson, Carolyn Sachra, and Lucy Jones were questioned
in chambers and sat on the jury. Br.Aplt. 29-30. Juror Mangelson was a retired
highway patrol trooper that trial counsel had worked with when counsel was
the Juab County attorney. R430-29. Juror Mangelson said that he would base
his decision solely on the evidence and the law as instructed by the trial court
and that he knew of nothing that would prevent him from being fair and
impartial. R430,461:Questionnaire 2.
The prosecutor recalled Juror Sachra saying that "if a person had drugs in
the car, they were probably guilty." R415. Although neither declaration from
counsel details any specific follow-up questions to her, the prosecutor could

"

"not recall any discussion about striking her for cause." R415. Juror Sachra
said that she would "try" her "best" to base her decision on the evidence and
the law and" to put strong feelings aside." R461:Questionnaire 3.
When Juror Jones was asked "whether she could be fair and impartial,"
she expressed "reservations about her ability to function as a juror." R429. She
was 68 and worked at an elementary school. R461:Questionnaire 13. When the
trial court repeated the question, Jones "replied that she understood what the
judge wanted and she believed she could serve as a juror." R429. Jones also
said she would base her decision solely on the evidence and the law and knew
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of nothing that would prevent her from being fair

and impartial.

'

R461:Questionnaire 13.
A.

This Court must presume that trial counsel's jury selection
decisions were strategic and therefore effective.

To prove that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel, Defendant bears the "heavy burden" of showing both that
his counsel's performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a

•

result. State v. Stidham, 2014 UT App 32, ill8, 320 P.3d 696 (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). To be deficient, counsel's performance

must "f[a]ll below an objective standard of reasonableness," Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 688. Reasonableness is measured by the "prevailing professional norms."

•

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003).

Showing that counsel's performance during jury selection was objectively
unreasonable is especially difficult because a Defendant must rebut several
presumptions. Strickland mandates "a strong presumption" that all of counsel's
actions are reasonably based on "sound trial strategy."

466 U.S. at 689

(quotation and citation omitted). Thus, to show deficient performance in any
context, a defendant must prove that "there was no conceivable tactical basis" for
his counsel's actions. State ·v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162 (quotation and
citation omitted).
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.

This is especially difficult to do in the jury selection context because "jury
selection is a highly selective, judgmental, an intuitive process" that is "more art
than science." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,r,r20-21, 12 P.3d 92. Defense
counsel "clearly have the right to identify and prefer particular jurors without

"

regard to any particular objective criterion or philosophy of jury selection." Id.
if23.

This discretion includes the ability to make decisions based on a

prospective juror's "demeanor, interaction with others in the courtroom, and
personality in general," or even on the nature of the juror's "eye contact" with
the attorney. Id. ,r21.
Given the highly subjective nature of jury selection, "the Strickland
standard requires the appellate court to make two distinct presumptions" in
addition

to

Strickland's

general

presumption

of

strategic,

reasonable

performance. Id. if 20. First, a court must presume that "trial counsel's lack of
objection to, or failure to remove, a particular juror is ... the product of a
conscious choice or preference."

Id.

Second, "trial counsel's presumably

conscious and strategic choice to refrain from removing a particular juror is
further presumed to constitute effective representation." Id.
Finally, in addition to these presumptions, this Court must "presume that
any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant
evidence of which [the] defendant is aware." Id. at if17. This presumption

"
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arises because Defendant bears the burden to provide a record

that

affirmatively rebuts the Strickland/ Litherland presumptions of strategic, effective

1

performance. See id. ,J,Jl6-17.
Because Defendant bears the burden of proof, "[i]t should go without

•

saying that the absence of evidence cannot overcome the 'strong presumption
that counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance."' Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 17 (2013). Thus, if "the record appears
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom
simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed
effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,Jl7.
B.

Defendant relies on the wrong prejudice standard.

Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective during jury
selection, because Defendant analyzes his argument under the wrong prejudice
standard.

Although a defendant must prove both Strickland elements, a

reviewing court need not address both "if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Because he relies on the wrong
standard, Defendant has not shown prejudice. This Court may therefore affirm
on that ground alone. See id. (court can reject ineffectiveness claim based on
lack of prejudice alone).
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To prove Strickland prejudice, a defendant must ordinarily demonstrate
"

that the alleged deficient performance "affected the outcome of the case."

Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 119.

But that is not the standard for proving

ineffectiveness during jury selection. In State v. King, 2008 UT 54, 1115-36, 190
P.3d 1283, the Utah Supreme Court held that to prevail on a claim that counsel
was ineffective during jury selection, a defendant "must show that his counsel's

"

actions ... allowed the seating of an actually biased juror." Thus, to prevail
here, Defendant must show that at least one of his jurors was actually biased.

See id.; see also State v. Sessions, 2014 UT 44, i131, 342 P.3d 738 (showing of
'" actual juror bias'" required to prove ineffective assistance for lacking neutral
"

ground for peremptory challenge); State v. Arriaga, 2012 UT App 295, il13, 288
P.3d 588 (counsel's deficient performance during jury selection prejudicial only
if biased juror sat).
Showing "actual bias," of course, requires more than merely showing
potential or even presumptive bias. See King, 2008 UT 54, ilil30-39.

As the

supreme court recognized, "stretching . . . the bounds of jury bias error" to
include only "possible juror bias" would be "illogical" and "lead to perverse
results." Id. ,I18. Thus, even though two jurors in King had "made disclosures
that suggested potential bias," King could not show Strickland prejudice

"
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•
without showing that his counsel's failure to remove the jurors "allowed the
seating of an actually biased juror." Id. at ifif19, 47 (emphasis added).

1

Defendant begrudgingly acknowledges that he is "forced" to challenge
the selection of his jury under an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.
Br.Aplt. 34.

•

But he refuses to acknowledge the correct prejudice analysis.

Defendant argues that to show prejudice he "must show 'a reasonable
probability' that with the effective assistance of counsel, the jury would have

•

had 'a reasonable doubt respecting guilt."' Br.Aplt. 34 (quoting State v. Hales,
2007 UT 14,

,r,rs6,

92-93, 152 P.3d 321).

Defendant later asserts that the

I

"question here is whether there was at least a reasonable probability of a
different result had [he] been allowed to participate in jury voir dire and

•

selection." Br.Aplt. 37.
As explained, however, the correct standard requires a showing that
"counsel's actions ... allowed the seating of an actually biased juror." King, 2008
UT 54, if 47 (emphasis added). Defendant cites King to support his claim that
one juror expressed bias. Br.Aplt. 36. But he does not acknowledge King's
holding that prejudice in this context requires a showing of actual bias. Br.Aplt.
36. Because Defendant fails to analyze his claim under the correct prejudice
standard, this Court should reject it on this ground alone.
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1. Defendant has not shown that any juror was actually biased.

Despite his failure to analyze his ineffectiveness claim under the correct
standard, Defendant does argue that Juror Sachra, "revealed a strong bias or
impression." Br.Aplt. 35. But the only evidence of bias that Defendant cites to
support this assertion is the prosecutor's recollection that during in-chambers
questioning, Juror Sachra stated that "if a person had drugs in the car, they
were probably guilty." Br.Aplt. 35 (quoting R415). Even assuming that this
amounts to an argument that Juror Sachra was actually biased, Defendant has
not made that showing.
As noted, the declarations of Defendant's trial counsel and the prosecutor
are the only record of the in-chambers questioning.

R432-24,417-08.

Defendant's trial counsel recalled that Juror Sachra was questioned in
chambers, but could not recall any details about that questioning. R430,428.
The prosecutor recalled that Juror Sachra said she had been a victim of rape,
that her son had been prosecuted in California for drugs, and that "she was
against drugs." R415. The prosecutor also recalled Juror Sachra saying "that if
a person had drugs in the car, they were probably guilty." R415. The record
contains no other details about Juror Sachra' s individual questioning.
Her questionnaire reveals that she was 71 years old. R461:Questionnaire
3. When asked whether she would "be able and willing to make [her] decision
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'
solely based on the evidence presented at trial" she wrote, "I would try." Id.
She also wrote that she would "do [her] best" "to follow the judge's instruction"

I

on the law even if she believed otherwise. Id. Finally, when asked, whether
there were any reason she "could not be an impartial and fair juror" she

•

responded, "I would do my best to put strong feelings aside." Id.
Juror Sachra' s single statement that someone with drugs in their car is
"probably guilty" does not show actual bias. First, the statement was equivocal.

'

Second, Defendant has not rebutted the presumption that his counsel
strategically, and therefore effectively chose to leave Juror Sachra on the jury

I

because any potential for bias was dispelled by further questioning. Finally, the
jury's split verdict demonstrates that no juror was actually biased against
Defendant.
a. Juror Sachra's single equivocal statement does not show
actual bias.

Juror Sachra' s single, equivocal statement does not show actual bias. The
juror said only that a person who had drugs in their car was "probably guilty."

•

R415 (emphasis added). Far from showing actual bias, such a statement reveals
only a common-sense conclusion likely shared by the overwhelming majority of
people.
The statement was also equivocal. Juror Sachra did not say that everyone
who is caught with drugs in their car was necessarily guilty. Rather, she said
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only that they were "probably guilty." R415. Thus, Juror Sachra's statement
did not establish that she was unwilling to base her ultimate decision on the
facts and the law. On the contrary, that was something she said she would
"try" her "best" to do. R461:Questionnaire 3. That uncontradicted statement

from her questionnaire-unlike the prosecutor's recollection of her statement
during individual questioning-was unequivocal. R461:Questionnaire 3. Thus,
Defendant has not shown that Juror Sachra' s equivocal statement demonstrates
actual bias.

"

b. Defendant has not rebutted the presumption that followup questioning dispelled any potential bias.

Second, Defendant has not proven that follow-up questioning did not
dispel any potential bias. Because Juror Sachra sat, this Court must presume
that counsel strategically decided to keep her on the jury because any potential

"

prejudice she exhibited was dispelled to counsel's satisfaction. See Litherland,
2000 UT 76, ,I,Il7, 20.

Defendant provides no evidence that any potential bias Juror Sachra may
have exhibited was not dispelled through follow-up questioning.

On the

contrary, the available record demonstrates, or at least does not rebut, the
strong presumption that follow-up questioning dispelled any potential bias.
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'
The trial court questioned each juror brought into chambers about their
ability to be impartial. After allowing counsel to question the individual jurors,

'

the trial court asked each "juror if he or she could be fair and impartial." R431.
True, the available record does not show how Juror Sachra answered this

•

question. . But the record supports the presumption that she answered it
affirmatively for two reasons. First, an affirmative answer would have been
consistent with her answers in her questionnaire that she would "try" her

•

"best" to decide the case based on the law and the evidence presented at trial.

'

R461:Questionnaire 3.
Second, neither side moved to strike her for cause even though, after
questioning each juror, the trial court asked whether either side desired to strike
that juror for cause. R431,416,412. The prosecutor recalled that if a juror had
answered in a manner indicating bias, he would have moved to strike that
juror. R415. The parties' and the trial court's failure to strike Juror Sachra
support the inference that she was not actually biased. See Uttecht v. Brown, 551
U.S. 1, 18 (2007) (inferring that "the interested parties present in the court room
all felt that removing" a juror "was appropriate" based on the parties' and trial

'

court's actions).
The record also demonstrates, or at least does not rebut, the strong
presumption that had Juror Sachra expressed potential bias, the attorneys
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would have asked her follow-up questions to probe the extent of that potential
bias.

The available record shows that both counsel followed up with other

prospective jurors who revealed potential bias.

R431,416.

Defense counsel

recalled asking follow-up questions of prospective jurors Sperry

and

Richardson. R429-28. The prosecutor recalled posing follow-up questions to
prospective jurors Laird, Jones, and Wood. R413. The record thus supports the
presumption that Juror Sachra was asked any necessary follow-up questions
and answered them to everyone's satisfaction.
A single statement that a juror believes a defendant is "probably" guilty
is not enough to establish actual bias when follow-up questioning dispels any
potential bias. For example, in State v. Hughes, 691 S.E.2d 813, 824 (W. Va. 2010),
a juror unequivocally answered "Yes" when asked whether she believed that
"when someone is charged, they're more likely than not to be guilty." But in
follow-up questioning, the juror explained her understanding that an arrest
warrant could issue only after a magistrate had made a probable cause finding.

Id. Hughes argued that the trial court erroneously refused to remove the juror
for cause because her answers revealed actual bias. See id. at 822. The West
Virginia Supreme Court disagreed, holding "that a prospective juror is not
subject to removal for cause merely because he/ she affirmatively answered a
question which, in essence, asked whether the juror believes that a person is
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'
arrested or charged because there is probable cause that the person is guilty."
Id. at 824.

'

In so holding, the court noted that at least five other courts had rejected
claims of actual bias based on prospective juror statements that the defendants

•

were "probably" or "more likely than not" guilty. Id. at 823-24; see Ladd v. State,
3 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (follow-up questioning dispelled any
potential bias where juror said he "leaned" towards believing defendant guilty

•

because he had been arrested and indicted); Pressley v. State, 770 So.2d 115, 12627 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (follow-up questioning dispelled any potential bias
where juror said defendant was "probably guilty" because he had been
charged); Raulerson v. State, 491 S.E.2d 791, 799 (Ga. 1997) (same); Commonwealth
v. Sweeney, 347 A.2d 286, 288 (Pa. 1975) (follow-up questioning dispelled any

potential bias where jurors said defendant "was more likely than not" guilty
because he was arrested); Cressell v. Commonwealth, 531 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Va. App.
2000) (follow-up questioning dispelled any potential bias where juror said
defendant was "probably guilty of something" because he was on h·ial).
Quoting State v. Saunders, Defendant argues that "a bare assertion
suggesting rehabilitation 'is not sufficient'" where a juror has expressed
potential bias. Br.Aplt. 31 (quoting State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, if36, 992 P.2d
951). But Saunders involved a preserved challenge to the trial court's refusal to
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allow counsel to ask follow-up questions of jurors who indicated possible bias,
not an argument that trial counsel was ineffective for not removing particular
jurors. See 1999 UT 59, i-132. Thus, while it is true that a juror's assurances of

"

impartiality may be insufficient to show that a trial court did not err in refusing
to strike that juror for cause, that principle is inapplicable to a claim that
counsel was ineffective for not removing a juror. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, i-120
(reviewing courts must presume counsel's jury selection decisions are strategic
and therefore effective).
Finally, the fact that the trial court did not raise any post-trial concerns
about Juror Sachra supports the presumption that she was not actually biased.
Although the trial court sua sponte raised a concern with trial counsel's
performance during jury selection, that concern involved only counsel's
decision to leave Juror Mangelson on the jury, not Juror Sachra. R268. The trial
court raised its concern just one week after trial.

R268.

The trial court's

omission of any concern about Juror Sachra, even though the jury selection
proceedings would have been fresh on the court's mind, supports the
presumption that Juror Sachra was not actually biased. Defendant has not
rebutted that presumption.
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'
c.

The jury's split verdict shows that no juror was actually
biased.

Finally, the jury's split verdict shows that no juror was actually biased.

'

Although the jury convicted Defendant of drug and paraphernalia possession,
and driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body, it acquitted
him of possessing a dangerous weapon by a restricted person.

•

R263-

58;R440:206-08. The jury did so even though Defendant admitted that the two

•

knives in his car were his, and even though the jury convicted him of
possessing a Schedule II controlled substance, which necessarily made him a
Category II restricted person. R259-58;R440:143; see Utah Code Ann. §58-37-

'

4(2)(b)(iii)(B) (listing Methamphetamine under Schedule II); Utah Code Ann.
§76-10-503(1)(b)(iv) (defining Category II restricted person as person in
possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance).

The jury apparently

believed Defendant's claim that the knives were not weapons, but merely tools
that he used at his job.

R440:145; see Utah Code Ann. §76-10-501(6)(a)(vi)

(listing the "lawful purposes for which the object may be used" as a factor for
evaluating whether object is a dangerous weapon).

The jury's split verdict

therefore demonstrates that it based its verdicts on the evidence, not bias.
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2. This Court must construe ambiguities and omissions in the
record in the prosecution's favor.

Defendant cannot complain that the record is inadequate for him to
demonstrate actual prejudice. As explained, he has the burden to provide a

"

record affirmatively rebutting the strong presumptions of effective assistance in
jury selection. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, if if 17, 20.
Assuming that Juror Sachra, or any other juror was actually biased,
Defendant had the means to provide a record showing that bias. Given the
recording error here, the State stipulated to, and this Court granted,
Defendant's motion to supplement and correct the record. R407. Defendant
provided declarations from the prosecutor and his trial counsel. R407,417-24.
But he chose not to provide declarations from the trial court or from any juror.
Defendant did not request a hearing to attempt to reconstruct the record. Nor
did he move for a remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
to create a record to support his ineffectiveness claims, even though the
supreme court has recognized that Rule 23B "offers the most effective method
to determine" post-trial whether jurors "were actually biased." State v. King,
2008 UT 54, ifif 41-46, 190 P.3d 1283.
This Court must presume that the record contains all of the evidence that
Defendant could marshal in support of his ineffectiveness claim. See Litherland,
2000 UT 76, if17. As demonstrated, that evidence does not show that Juror
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Sachra was actually biased. Thus, Defendant has not shown that his counsel
was ineffective during jury selection. See King, 2008 UT 54, 147.
C.

'

Alternatively, Defendant has not rebutted the strong
presumption that his counsel's jury selection decisions were
strategic and therefore effective.

Defendant also has not rebutted the strong presumption that his counsel

'

performed adequately during jury selection and that he strategically decided to
keep jurors Sachra, Mangelson, and Jones.

Defendant asserts that he has

•

rebutted this presumption because counsel did not "involve [him] in the voir
dire proceedings." Br.Aplt. 22. He also contends that he has shown that his

I

counsel's jury selection decisions were not strategic because: (1) his counsel was
"inattentive or indifferent" during jury selection; (2) Juror Sachra expressed
"unequivocal bias"; and (3) his counsel's choices were "implausible and
unjustifiable." Br.Aplt. 30-33.
But the record does not rebut the presumption that counsel adequately
advised Defendant of his right to participate in the in-chambers questioning
and that Defendant waived that right.

Nor does it rebut the strong

presumption that counsel's jury selection decisions were strategic.
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1. Defendant has not rebutted the presumption that his counsel
advised him of the right to participate in the in-chambers
questioning and that Defendant waived the right.

.

Absent affirmative evidence to the contrary, this Court must presume
that trial counsel effectively involved Defendant in jury selection. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689 (mandating "a strong presumption" that counsel's decisions are
strategic); Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,r17 (record deficiencies are "construed in
favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively").

Defendant has not

provided any non-speculative evidence to rebut the presumption that he and
his counsel discussed his presence during the in-chambers questioning and that
Defendant waived any right to be present.
Assuming that Defendant had a right to be present during the inchambers questioning, he waived that right by failing to assert it. The "'right
[to be present at trial] is not absolute and may be waived by word or act of the
person claiming it."' State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if 34, 48 P.3d 953 (quoting
State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1982)).

In Hubbard, the defendant argued that the trial court plainly erred by not
including him in sidebar discussions between the trial court, prospective jurors,

,

and counsel. Id. if31. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, holding that even
assuming that [Hubbard] possessed a state constitutional and statutory right to
be present during all discussions with potential jurors, Hubbard waived that

,
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I

right "by failing to assert it." Id. ili-131-34. Relying on United States Supreme
Court precedent, the Hubbard court held that "a trial court 'need not get an

I

express "on the record" waiver from the defendant for every trial conference
which a defendant may have a right to attend."' Id. i-134 (quoting United States

•

v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 528 (1985)). "A defendant knowing of a discussion
must assert whatever right he may have to be present." Id.
Here, the trial court announced in open court that it would question

•

individual prospective jurors in chambers. R440:21. There is no evidence that
Defendant expressed any desire to be present during that portion of jury
selection.

Absent such evidence, this Court must presume that Defendant

waived any right to be present in chambers. See Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ili-131-34.

'

Defendant argues that he did not waive his right to be present because he
"was not invited to participate" and "had no notice of his right to attend" the
in-chambers questioning.

Br.Aplt. 19.

'

But Defendant provides no non-

speculative record evidence to support these allegations.
Defendant has deliberately chosen not to provide his own declaration
regarding his involvement in jury selection. This Court must therefore presume
that any information he could have provided would not have supported his
ineffectiveness claims. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, i-117.
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'

Instead, Defendant relies entirely on two sentences from his trial
counsel's declaration stating: "I do not recall that I had any conversations with
[Defendant] about any part of the jury selection process.

He was not in

chambers and not involved in the process." Br.Aplt. 19; R428.
These statements do not prove that Defendant "was not invited to
participate" and "had no notice of his right to attend" the in-chambers

"

questioning. Br.Aplt. 19. Trial counsel's inability to recall discussing whether
Defendant wished to be present during the in-chambers questioning does not
establish that such discussions did not happen. This is especially true when
counsel was attempting to recall events from over fifteen months earlier.
Defendant merely speculates that he and his counsel did not discuss his
presence during the in-chambers questioning. But, as explained, ambiguity and
speculation regarding counsel's performance is inadequate to establish that
counsel was ineffective. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,17; see also Fernandez v.

Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)("[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.").
Counsel could have reasonably decided to advise Defendant not to attend
the in-chambers questioning because the jurors would likely be 1nore candid if
he were not there. See United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1397 (3d Cir. 1994)
(" doubt[ing] whether the jurors would have been as comfortable discussing
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•
their conduct had Bertoli been present."); State v. Alexander, 833 N.W.2d 126, 135
(Wis. 2013) (recognizing that "jurors may very well have been intimidated and
deterred from speaking forthrightly about their potential bias with Alexander
seated only a few feet away").
Defendant provides no non-speculative evidence that he and his counsel
did not discuss the in-chambers questioning and that, based on that discussion,
Defendant chose to waive any right he had to be present. Nor does Defendant

•

provide any evidence of what he would have contributed had he been present,
or that he would have insisted that his counsel object to the three jurors that his

'

appellate counsel now challenges. Defendant thus has not rebutted the strong
presumption that his counsel adequately involved him in the jury selection

•

process and that he waived any right to be present during the in-chambers
questioning.
2.

Defendant has not rebutted the presumption that his
counsel's jury selection decisions were strategic.

Defendant also argues that he has rebutted the strong presumptions that
his counsel's jury selection decisions were strategic and therefore effective.
Br.Aplt. 30-33; see Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ~20. To rebut these presumptions,
Defendant must show that either (1) "defense counsel was so inattentive or
indifferent during the jury selection process that the failure to remove a
prospective juror was not the product of a conscious choice or preference"; (2)
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"a prospective juror expressed bias so strong or unequivocal that no plausible
countervailing subjective preference could justify failure to remove that juror";
or (3) "some other specific evidence clearly demonstrating that counsel's choice
was not plausibly justifiable." Id. Defendant argues that he has made all three
showings. He has not.
a. Defendant has not shown that his counsel was inattentive
or indifferent during jury selection.

Defendant first argues that his counsel was "inattentive or indifferent"
during jury selection. Br.Aplt. 30. "To demonstrate actual inattentiveness or
indifference, defendant must either prove a specific and clear example of
inattentiveness that directly caused the failure to object to a particular juror, or
else show that counsel generally failed to participate in a meaningful way in the
process as a whole." See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 125 n.10.
Defendant does not contend that his counsel "generally failed to
participate" in the process. Br.Aplt. 30-33. Nor could he, where the record
shows that counsel actively participated in questioning prospective jurors and
exercised all of his pere1nptory strikes.

R431-28,416-12.

Rather, Defendant

argues only that his counsel's failure to object to Jurors Sachra and Jones
provide "specific exarnple[s] of inattentiveness." Br.Aplt. 30-31.
Defendant argues that his counsel was inattentive to Juror Sachra because
he did not remove her after "she expressed bias." Br.Aplt. 30. But as explained,
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•
she did not express bias and Defendant has not proven that follow-up
questioning did not dispel any potential bias she may have disclosed.
As for Juror Jones, Defendant argues that trial counsel was "indifferent"
to her "reservations about her ability to be fair and impartial." Br.Aplt. 30. In
his declaration, defense counsel recalled that Juror Jones was "quite reluctant to
disclose what was going on in her own mind" and that, when asked "whether
she could be fair and impartial, she had reservations about her ability to
function as a juror." R429. He also recalled that when the trial court asked a
second time "whether she could be fair and impartial," she "replied that she
understood what the judge wanted and she believed she could serve as a juror."

•

R429.
Defendant has not shown that his counsel was inattentive or indifferent
to Juror Jones.

Rather, the fact that he recalled what he perceived to be a

reluctance to disclose her thoughts demonstrates that he paid attention to her.
R429.
Defendant has not shown that Juror Jones' responses were so h·oubling
that all reasonable attorneys would remove her.

•

Contrary to Defendant's

representations, the record does not establish that Juror Jones expressed

•

reservations "about her ability to be fair and impartial." Br.Aplt. 30. Rather, it
establishes only that she expressed "reservations about her ability to function as

'
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a juror." R429. Those reservations could have stemmed from her age (she was
68) or her employment (she worked at an elementary school), or some other
reservation about her personal circumstances unrelated to her impartiality.
R461:Questionnaire 13.
The fact that defense counsel recalled that Juror Jones raised her concerns
in the context of a question about whether she could be fair and impartial does
not resolve this ambiguity in the record. This is especially true where Juror
Jones unequivocally declared in her questionnaire that she would base her
decision solely on the evidence, that she would follow the law as instructed,
and that she had no reason to feel she "could not be an impartial and fair juror."
R461:Questionnaire 13.
Defendant contends that Juror Jones was not successfully rehabilitated.
Br.Aplt. 31. But again, while that argument may be sufficient to establish error
in the denial of a for-cause challenge, it is irrelevant in the context of an
ineffective assistance claim. Under Litherland, defense counsel may reasonably
decide not to remove a juror even when the juror has expressed potential bias.

See 2000 UT 76, ,r22. Defendant therefore has not shown that his counsel's
handling of either Juror Sachra or Jones constitutes a "specific and clear
example of inattentiveness." See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,r2s n.10.

"
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•
b. Defendant has not shown that any juror expressed bias so
strong that no attorney could reasonably decide not to
remove that juror.

.

Defendant argues that Juror Sachra "expressed the sort of strong,
unequivocal bias that would cause a reasonable person to second guess

.

counsel's actions in failing to remove her." Br.Aplt. 31. Again, the record does
not support Defendant's contention that Juror Sachra was biased. He therefore
fails to rebut the Litherland presumptions on this basis. See 2000 UT 76, 120.
c.

Defendant has not shown that his counsel had no
plausible or justifiable reason for keeping Juror
Mangelson on the jury.

Finally, Defendant argues that that there was "no plausible or justifiable
reason for keeping Uuror] Mangelson on the jury." Br.Aplt. 32. Defendant

•

notes that Juror Mangelson was a retired highway patrol trooper who had
worked in drug interdiction on 1-15 for many years and who knew Trooper

•
Sheets. Br.Aplt. 20, 32.
The record reveals that Juror Mangelson had about 40 years' experience
as a highway patrolman and had been involved in many jury trials over his
career.

R430,415.

Juror Mangelson knew Trooper Sheets, but had not

supervised him. R415. Although he could not remember "specific questions or

•

answers," trial counsel did recall that Juror Mangelson "would have assured us
that he knew how to be fair, and that he could be fair, if selected as a juror."
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R430.

The prosecutor recalled that defense counsel specifically asked Juror

Mangelson if he would give Trooper Sheets' testimony more weight, that Juror
Mangelson said that "he would not," and said that "he would make up his
mind based on the facts presented in court." R415.
On his questionnaire, Juror Mangelson wrote that he had been employed
by a law enforcement agency. R461:Questionnaire 2. He also unequivocally
affirmed that he would base his decision solely on the evidence, that he would
follow the law as instructed by the trial court, and that there was no reason that
he "could not be an impartial and fair juror." R461:Questionnaire 2.
Defendant faults Juror Mangelson for not revealing on his questionnaire
"his years of experience as a highway patrolman," "his assignments relating to
drug interdiction on 1-15," and that he knew Trooper Sheets. Br.Aplt. 20. The
questionnaire,

however,

did

not

ask

for

such

specific

information.

R461:Questionnaire 2. But Juror Mangelson did reveal this information during
in-chambers questioning. R415. Both sides passed Juror Mangelson for cause.
R430.
The record shows that trial counsel 1nade a strategic decision to keep
Juror Mangelson. Counsel not only knew Juror Mangelson personally, counsel
had also worked with him when counsel was a prosecuting attorney for Juab
County and Juror Mangelson was a highway patrol supervisor. R430. Counsel
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.
knew that Juror Mangelson "had done a lot of work on freeway stops." R429.
Counsel believed that Juror Mangelson would be critical of the Trooper's tactics
in this case and therefore be favorably disposed to the Defendant. R429. In his
words, counsel "thought" that Juror Mangelson "would hear the evidence of
how this stop occurred and know that it was not proper." R429.
Defendant argues that counsel's strategic reasons "were implausible"
because the propriety of the stop was not for the jury to decide. Br.Aplt. 32.
Granted, the jury was not directly tasked with deciding the constitutionality of
the stop. But counsel could nevertheless reasonably strategize that a juror who
might reasonably conclude that the stop was problematic, might also be
sympathetic to the defense theory. That theory was to concede guilt on the
misdemeanor charges involving marijuana, but to contest the felony charges
involving other drugs and possession of a dangerous weapon.
Counsel's trial and jury-selection strategies were reasonable. "It is not
necessarily per se ineffective assistance for a defense attorney to advance a
nonlegal defense, such as a plea for jury nullification ... when the circumstances
of the case render other defensive sh·ategies unavailable." People v. Woods, 961
N.E.2d 466, 473 (Ill. App. 2011). Counsel "may present a defense evoking the
empathy, compassion or understanding and sympathy of the jurors."

Id.;

Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1089 (9th Cir.2000) (reliance on nullification
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defense can be "'strategic choice' that survives under Strickland") cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1036 (2001), disapproved of on other grounds, Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d
1036, 1043 (9th Cir.2002)).
Here, trial counsel suggested that Trooper Sheets stopped Defendant only
because he was Hispanic and coming from California. R440:98. During crossexamination, counsel suggested that Sheets may not have been able to clearly
see Defendant's license plate until after stopping him. R440:96-98. Counsel also
got Sheets to concede that he may have followed Defendant with his lights
activated before he could see Defendant's license plate. R440:93-96.
Then, in closing argument, defense counsel conceded that Defendant was
driving with marijuana metabolite in his system and that he possessed
paraphernalia for smoking marijuana.

R440:184-86.

Counsel argued that

Defendant's California medical marijuana authorization explained, but did not
legally justify, his actions in Utah. R440:184-86. But counsel also argued that
the jury should acquit on the other charges because Defendant did not know of
the other drugs and paraphernalia in the car, and the knives were tools, not
dangerous weapons. R440:190-96.
Counsel's strategy was partially successful. As explained, the jury did
not convict Defendant of all charges. R263-58. Rather, it acquitted him on the
dangerous weapon possession count even though he admitted that the knives
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•
in the car were his and even though the jury's guilty verdicts on the controlled
substance possession charges necessarily made Defendant a restricted person.

.

One possible explanation for the acquittal on this charge is that Juror
Mangelson convinced the other jurors to be merciful because the legality of the

.

traffic stop was at least debatable. The jury had watched portions of Sheets'
dash-cam video of the stop and, as mentioned, defense counsel cross-examined

.

Sheets' about the details of the stop and the field sobriety tests. R440:46-49,5565,93-101.

Because counsel may reasonably present a defense based on

compassion or sympathy, see Woods, 961 N.E.2d at 473, Defendant has not

.

shown that his counsel's strategic reason for keeping Juror Mangelson on the
jury was "implausible and unjustifiable."

•

In short, Defendant has not rebutted the strong presumption that his
counsel made reasonable strategic decisions during jury selection. Nor has he

.

shown that any juror was actually biased. Consequently, he has not proven
that his counsel was ineffective during jury selection.
D. Defendant could not show that the trial court erred, let alone
plainly erred, during jury selection.

Although Defendant argues only that his counsel was ineffective during
jury selection, he prefaces that argument by implying that the trial court erred
when it did not require his presence during the in-chambers questioning.
Defendant asserts that he was" denied the opportunity to be present at a critical
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stage" of his trial when he was "denied the right to participate" in individual
juror questioning. Br.Aplt. 16-17. But had Defendant raised this unpreserved
claim as an allegation of plain error, he still could not have prevailed.
To show plain error, a defendant must show that a trial court committed
obvious, prejudicial error. See State v. Beckering, 2015 UT App 53, ,19, 346 P.3d
672. Defendant could not do so here because controlling law did not require the
trial court to include Defendant in the in-chambers questioning, or to obtain a
formal waiver of his presence.
The "absolute right to be present at all voir dire conferences," including
in-chambers individual questioning, "has not been expressly recognized in
Utah." State v. Zamora, 2005 UT App 196U, i-!4. This Court has therefore held
that a trial court does not plainly err when it questions jurors in chambers

"

without the defendant present. State v. Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, ,19, 196 P.3d
124.
Defendant implies that he had a due process right to be present because
jury selection is a critical stage of a trial. Br.Aplt. 15. For support, he relies on

Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989), and Hopt v. Utah Territory, 110
U.S. 574, 578 (1884). Br.Aplt. 15.
Neither case helps Defendant. Gomez was not about a Defendant's right
to be present during jury selection. See 490 U.S. 859-62. Rather, it addressed

"
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II

only whether the Federal Magistrates Act allowed a magistrate to preside "at
the selection of a jury in a felony trial without the defendant's consent." Id. at
859-60.
And while Hopt discussed a defendant's presence during jury selection,

•

the United States Supreme Court has long since recognized that Hopt "has been
distinguished and limited."

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934),

overruled in part on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2 n.1 (1964). In

•

fact, the Snyder court stated that what "was said in Hopt v. Utah, ... on the
subject of the presence of a defendant was dictum, and no more." Id. at 118 n.2.
Defendant mentions Snyder once, but only in a one-sentence footnote that does
not account for its express limitation of Hopt. Br.Aplt. 15 n.7.

.

As this Court has recognized, Snyder "set out the standard for when a
defendant has a right to presence under the due process clause." State v. Burk,
839 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah App. 1992).

Under Snyder, a defendant has a due

process right "to be present ... whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably
substantiat to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge."

Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06. But this right does not require that a defendant be
present at all proceedings. See id.; see also Burk, 839 P.2d at 886-88 (holding that
Burk had no right to be present during post-verdict questioning of jurors about
alleged improper contact with witnesses). Instead, a defendant's constitutional
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.

,

right to be present exists "to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be
thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only."

Id. at 107-08.

Thus, a

defendant need not be present during all communications between a judge and
a juror.

See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per curiam)

(holding that defendant's absence during in-chambers discussion between
judge and a juror to ascertain bias did not violate defendant's due process
rights); Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, ,I19 (no plain error in interviewing jurors in
chambers without defendant); Burk, 839 P.2d at 888. When the defendant's
"presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow," due process does not
require his presence at a trial proceeding. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106-07.
No record evidence shows that Defendant's presence during the
individual juror questioning would have been useful or beneficial. As noted,
Defendant cites no record evidence establishing: (1) that he even wished to be
present during the in-chambers questioning; (2) what his presence would have
contributed; or (3) that he would not have relied entirely on his counsel's jury
selection decisions. Thus, Defendant could not establish any right to be present
during the in-chambers questioning.
Additionally, as explained, even if Defendant had a clearly-established
right to be present during in-chambers questioning, he waived that right by not
asserting it. See State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ,J31, 48 P.3d 953. Thus, any error
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in not including Defendant the in-chambers questioning would not have been
obvious. See id.; Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, ,I 19. Defendant therefore could not
have shown that the trial court plainly erred. See Beckering, 2015 UT A pp 53,
,119.

II.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE IN HANDLING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

Defendant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in
handling the motion to suppress the drugs, paraphernalia, and knives found in
his car. Br.Aplt. 47. Defendant argues that his trial counsel "failed to make
timely and proper arguments for suppression of the evidence." Br.Aplt. 48-49.
Defendant does not argue that his trial counsel should have challenged the
legality of the initial stop, nor does he argue that the field sobriety tests did not
establish probable cause to arrest him. Br.Aplt. 39. Rather, he argues only that
his counsel was ineffective for not persuading the trial court that Trooper Sheets
"extended the detention beyond the initial purpose of the traffic stop without
sufficient justification." Br.A plt. 38; see also Br.Aplt. 39 (declaring that this "case
involves the officer's actions under the second prong of the analysis" in State v.

Baker, 2010 UT 18, ,Il7, 229 P.3d 650).
Defendant contends that trial counsel should have argued that Trooper
Sheets lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop because: (1) the dash-cam
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video contradicted Sheets' observations of Defendant's speech and mannerisms;
and (2) Defendant's history of controlled substance possession was too old.
Br.Aplt. 40-42, 44, 49.

Defendant also argues that Sheets' trial testimony

undermined his prior testimony at the suppression hearing. Br.Aplt. 42, 45-46,
49.
Defendant's new arguments do not prove that his counsel was ineffective
in handling the motion to suppress. Defendant improperly parses the evidence,
rather than examining it as a whole.

The video does not refute Sheets'

observations, and Defendant's criminal history validly contributed to Sheets'
reasonable suspicion. Moreover, trial counsel could not have relied on Sheets'
trial testimony in litigating the pre-trial suppression motion.

Regardless,

Sheets' trial testimony did not undermine a reasonable suspicion finding. The
totality of the circumstances here adequately established reasonable suspicion
to investigate whether Defendant was under the influence of a controlled
substance.
As explained, to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must
prove both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).

Because his ineffectiveness claim hinges on his

counsel's handling of a motion to suppress evidence, Defendant "must also
prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a
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reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the
excludable evidence." Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986).
A. Defendant has not shown that his counsel performed deficiently
in handling the motion to suppress, because the totality of the
circumstances established reasonable suspicion.

As explained, to prove deficient performance under Strickland, Defendant
must show that his counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." 466 U.S. at 688. Put differently, "trial counsel's error must be
so egregious that no reasonably competent attorney would have acted
similarly." Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir.
2011).
Because Strickland is grounded in reasonableness, it asks only "whether

.

an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under 'prevailing
professional norms,' not whether it deviated from best practices or most
common custom."

.

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 88 (2011) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The Sixth Amendment creates "no expectation that

competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or tactician."

See id. at 110.

Defendants "have a right to a competent lawyer, but not to Clarence Darrow."
United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2003). Defendant has not shown

that any of the arguments that he now raises were so obviously meritorious that
every reasonable attorney would have recognized and raised them.
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Like any other seizure, a traffic stop is reasonable if it was (1) "lawful at
its inception," and (2) "executed in a reasonable manner." Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).

As explained, Defendant challenges only Trooper

Sheets' decision to extend the stop to conduct field sobriety tests, not his
decision to make the initial stop. Br.Aplt. 39.
A traffic stop is reasonable in its execution so long as the officer
"diligently pursue[s]" a course of action likely to fulfill the purpose of the stop.
See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). Officers are also allowed '"to

graduate their responses to the demands of [the] particular situation."

Id.

(citation omitted). Accordingly, if "during the scope of [a lawful] traffic stop,
the officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the
officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion." State v. Baker, 2010
UT 18, if 13,229 P.3d 650. That occurred here.
While reasonable suspicion requires more than a "hunch," it does "not
require an officer to rule out innocent conduct or establish the likelihood of
criminal conduct to the same degree as required for probable cause." State v.
Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ,-r23, 164 P.3d 397.

"

Simply put, reasonable suspicion

exists "when a law enforcement officer has 'a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."' Navarette ·v.
California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (citations omitted).
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Evaluating whether reasonable susp1c10n exists requires a court to
examine "the totality of the circumstances." See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 274 (2002). Reviewing "courts cannot evaluate individual facts in isolation
to determine whether each fact has an innocent explanation. Rather, courts

•

must look to the 'totality of the circumstances' to determine whether, taken
together, the facts warranted further investigation by the police officer." State v.
Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ifl4, 147 P.3d 425 (citation omitted).

A '"divide-and-

conquer analysis"' is improper. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. The constellation of
circumstances here show that this traffic stop quickly, and properly, evolved

•

into a drug-impaired driving investigation supported by reasonable suspicion.
Trooper Sheets was a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) with years of
experience in detecting drug-impaired driving. R436:2,13. He encountered a
Defendant who could not produce a valid driver's license, had "rapid speech

•

and rapid jittery movements" that-in Sheets' experience-were inconsistent
with typical nervousness, and also had a history of controlled substance abuse.
R436:8-9;R440:56.
The constellation of these circumstances established "a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting" Defendant of controlled substance use.

See

Navarette, 134 S.Ct. at 1687. For example, in State v. Hogue, 2007 UT App 86,

,rs,

157 P.3d 826, the defendant's "dilated pupils, nervous demeanor, and jerky
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body movements" established reasonable suspicion to extend a stop to
investigate possible impairment. Likewise, in State v. Stewart, 2014 UT App 289,
,I16, 340 P.3d 802, the officer's observations that Stewart was "jittery,"" dancing

around in the car," and had "constricted" pupils and slurred speech created
reasonable suspicion justifying further investigation.
Granted, Trooper Sheets did not see dilated pupils or hear slurred speech.
But he did hear Defendant's "jittery ... fast speech." R436:8.
And he also knew that Defendant had a history of drug abuse.
R436:8;R440:48-49;R460:3-4.

As this Court has recognized, relevant criminal

history "can be a factor in determining reasonable suspicion."

Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah App. 1997).

State v.

Defendant's history of

controlled substance abuse is an additional factor not present in either Hogue or

Ste1uart.
In addition to Defendant's suspicious speech and manner, and his history
of drug abuse, Defendant also could not produce a valid driver's license.
R436:6-8.

That fact provided another valid consideration in the reasonable

suspicion calculus. See United States v. Raynor, 108 Fed. Appx. 609, 610, 613
(10th Cir. 2004) (driver's inability to produce valid driver's license was one
factor contributing to reasonable suspicion to extend stop).
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When properly

considered together, these facts established reasonable suspicion. See Navarette,

.

134 S.Ct. at 1687.

1.

Defendant's speech and manner were valid considerations.

Defendant argues generally that a suspect's "mannerisms ... when
considered alone or even with other factors, fail to support reasonable
suspicion." Br.Aplt. 41. Defendant also contends that Sheets' observations of
his rapid manner and speech cannot support a reasonable suspicion finding for
two reasons. Br.Aplt. 42. First, Defendant argues that Sheets undermined any
reliance on Defendant's speech and mannerisms when Sheets testified at trial
that "he was not familiar with" Defendant and acknowledged that Defendant's
manner may "have been his 'normal way."'

Br.Aplt. 42 (quoting R440:56-

57,101). Second, Defendant argues that Sheets' dash-cam video "fails to support

that [Defendant's] speech or manners were rapid or unusual."

Br.Aplt. 42.

Defendant argues that the video "shows that [he] behaved normally." Br.Aplt.
49.

None of Defendant's arguments undermines a reasonable susp1c10n
finding. First, as this Court has held, a suspect' s mannerisms and speech can
conh·ibute to an officer's reasonable suspicion. See Stewart, 2014 UT App 289,
-i[16; Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, -i[8.
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Nor does Sheets' trial testimony acknowledging that Defendant's
suspicious mannerisms may have been his "normal way" defeat a reasonable
suspicion finding.

Most importantly, trial counsel could not have relied on

Sheets' trial testimony in opposing a pre-trial motion to suppress. See Utah R.
Crim. P. 12(c)(l)(B) (requiring suppression motion to be filed at least five days
before trial).
But even if counsel could have raised this argument in a new trial motion,
Sheets' acknowledgement of a possible innocent explanation for Defendant's
suspicious behavior-made outside the context of a suppression hearing-does
not undermine a reasonable suspicion finding. Although an "officer's suspicion
must be based on specific and articulable facts and rational inferences," an
officer's determination of reasonable suspicion "need not rule out the
possibility of innocent conduct." See State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26,

ino,

112

P.3d 507 (quotations and citations omitted); Cf State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5,

1122-24, 779 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (possible innocent explanations of behavior did
not undermine sufficiency of evidence showing constructive possession). Thus,
the fact that Defendant's rapid manner may have had an innocent explanation
is irrelevant.
Moreover, Sheets emphasized at the suppression hearing that in his
highly specialized training and experience, Defendant's behavior was atypical
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'
and suggested drug use. R436:2,8-9,13. Sheets' observations thus provided
ample reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Defendant to conduct field sobriety
tests. See, e.g., Hogue, 2007 UT App 86, ,IS (dilated pupils, nervous demeanor,
and jerky body movements justified brief detention to conduct field sobriety
tests); State v. Richards, 2009 UT App 397, ,IlO, 224 P.3d 733 (emphasizing
officer's training and experience in evaluating reasonable suspicion).
Nor has Defendant shown that the dash-cam video refutes Sheets'
observations. It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately evaluate Defendant's
manner and speech in the less-than-two-minute portion of the video showing
Sheets' interaction with Defendant before Sheets orders him out of the car for
field sobriety tests. SE #1 at 11:23:50-11:25:20. Defendant's movements are
mostly indiscernible; only the back of Defendant's head is visible. Id. Most of
what Defendant says is largely unintelligible. Id. And at least a portion of what

•

is intelligible arguably supports Sheets' characterization of Defendant's speech
as "fast." Id.;R436:8. As Sheets explained at trial, the video supports his trained
observation that Defendant exhibited rapid speech and mannerisms. R440:99
("Well, like you saw in the video, it appears that he had fast speech, and he has
fast movements.").
Defendant's behavior after he is out of the car does not undermine a
reasonable suspicion finding for three reasons. First, Defendant's out-of-the-car
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behavior is largely irrelevant because, by then, Sheets had already decided to
· extend the stop. Second, Defendant's behavior once he knows he is under close
scrutiny for field sobriety testing is not necessarily indicative of his behavior
during what he would had perceived to be a more spontaneous interaction with
Sheets during the initial portion of the stop.
Finally, while it may appear to appellate counsel's untrained eye that
Defendant's behavior is unremarkable, appellate counsel is not a DRE. Sheets
was. R440:13. Sheets' specialized training and extensive experience is critical
here because officers "may draw on their own experiences and specialized
training to make inferences from deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that might well elude an untrained person."'

State ·v.

Anderson, 2013 UT App 272, ,-i27, 316 P.3d 949 (quotations and citations

omitted).
Moreover, rather than dispelling Sheets' suspicion that Defendant was
impaired, the field sobriety tests confirmed that suspicion, something
Defendant does not dispute. R436:12-15. Sheets' also observed that Defendant
had eyelid h·emors during the tests, a fact that is impossible to see on the video.
R440:61;SE#l 11:36:15-11:43:39.
Defendant suggests that Sheets "changed" his testimony about the nature
of Defendant's speech by describing it at the suppression hearing as "fast" and

"
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"jittery," and then describing it at trial as "rapid."

Br.Aplt. 40-41.

But

Defendant does not explain how these two synonymous descriptions are
inconsistent.
In sum, Defendant's rapid speech and mannerisms were valid
considerations and Defendant has not shown that the video refutes Sheets'
trained observations. And even if the video arguably refuted some of Sheets'

.

observations, it does not so clearly do so that all reasonable counsel would have
raised that argument in a suppression motion. Defendant therefore has not
shown that his counsel performed deficiently by not challenging the validity of
Sheets' observations. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
2. Defendant's history
consideration.

of

drug possession was a valid

Defendant also argues that his history of convictions and arrests for drug
possession cannot support a reasonable suspicion finding because his last arrest
was three years before the stop. Br.Aplt. 44. But Defendant cites no authority
holding that criminal history can become too stale to be considered in the
reasonable suspicion context.

Two of the cases he cites involve the more

rigorous probable cause standard, not the reasonable suspicion standard at
issue here. See State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah App. 1993) (reviewing
whether probable cause supported search warrant); State v. Keener, 2008 UT
App 288, ,IS, 191 P.3d 835 (same).
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.
.

Defendant also argues that under State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143
(Utah App. 1997), this Court held that criminal history must be "ongoing" to be
relevant in the reasonable suspicion context. Br.Aplt. 43. But Hymphrey did not
limit relevant criminal history to only that which is "ongoing." See 937 P.2d at
143.

Rather, the Humphrey court observed that "information regarding an

individual's past, and in this case ongoing, criminal activity can be a factor in
determining reasonable suspicion."

Id.

The observation that Humphrey's

criminal activity happened to be "ongoing" thus served only to bolster the
reasonable suspicion finding in that case, not to limit reasonable suspicion
analysis in every case to consideration of only "ongoing" criminal activity. See

id.
Defendant also argues that an officer must have personal knowledge of a
suspect' s criminal history for it to contribute to reasonable suspicion. Br.Aplt.
43. The State does not dispute that an officer must base his suspicion on factors
he personally knows. But here, Trooper Sheets did know about Defendant's
criminal history because dispatch informed him of it before he decided to
extend the stop and conduct field sobriety tests. R460:4.
Defendant's criminal history was relevant.

A defendant's "criminal

history contributes powerfully to the reasonable suspicion calculus" when considered

"

with other factors. United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2010)
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(quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Humphrey, 937

.

P.2d at 143.
Defendant's history of drug-related arrests and convictions contributed to
Sheets' reasonable suspicion. Defendant had a 2001 charge and a later 2001

•

felony conviction for controlled substance possession; a 2006 felony charge for
controlled substance possession; and, in 2007, had violated his probation by
again possessing controlled substances.

R460:3-4.

Although Defendant's

probation violation was three years before this stop, five years separated
Defendant's initial controlled substance conviction and his 2006 felony
possession charge. R460:3-5. His history therefore demonstrated recurring and
lengthy involvement with controlled substances.

Defendant has thus not

•

shown that his trial counsel was deficient for not challenging Sheets' reliance on
his criminal history.
3. Other factors do not undermine a reasonable suspicion
finding.

Defendant argues that other factors undermined the reasonable suspicion
finding.

First, he asserts that he was polite and cooperative and answered

Sheets' questions clearly and honestly.
authority holdi...'l.g that these factors

Br.Aplt. 45. But Defendant cites no
negate a highly-trained

officer's

observations of speech and mannerisms that suggest controlled substance use,
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•

especially when coupled with a suspect's long history of drug abuse and
inability to produce a valid driver's license.
Second, Defendant argues that "Sheets changed his story at trial" about

"

how he first encountered Defendant's car.

Br.Aplt. 45-46, 49.

At the

suppression hearing, Sheets testified that he was stopped on the side of
northbound 1-15 when Defendant passed him and he noticed the missing
sticker on Defendant's license plate. R436:31-32. At trial, Sheets testified that he
was

traveling southbound when he noticed Defendant's car headed

northbound and decided to follow it because it initially looked like a Honda,
and Hondas are often stolen. R440:93-94. Sheets testified at trial that he drove
across the median, caught up to Defendant's car, and then noticed the missing
license plate sticker. R440:95-96.
Sheets also acknowledged for the first time at trial that his overhead
lights may have been on when he drove through the median and began
following Defendant. R440:93-95. Sheets suggested that his dash cam video
confirmed this, although he later testified that he may have, at some point,
turned his lights off and then on again. R440:93-95. The video, however, shows
that Sheets' lights were off for at least 30 seconds as he approached Defendant.
SE#l at 11:22:42-11:23:30. It also shows that, before activating his lights, Sheets
pulled alongside Defendant close enough to allow him to examine Defendant's
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license plate, and only then pulled directly behind Defendant before activating
his lights. SE#l at 11:22:42-11:23:30.
Sheets' inconsistency about how he first noticed Defendant's car is
irrelevant for three reasons. First, as explained, trial counsel could not have
relied on Sheets' trial testimony to support his pre-trial suppression motion.
Second, this inconsistency goes only to Sheets' justification for the initial stop.
As explained, Defendant does not contend that his counsel should have
challenged the initial stop. Br.Aplt.38-39. Third, the video confirms that Sheets
did not activate his lights until after he had the opportunity to view
Defendant's noncompliant license plate. SE#l at 11:22:42-11:23:30. The stop
was therefore justified at its inception. See State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, 116, 259
P.3d 116 (stop is justified if officer reasonably believes traffic violation has

.

occurred).
In sum, Defendant has not shown that his counsel performed deficiently
for not raising these additional arguments in the motion to suppress.
B.

Defendant has not shown prejudice because none of the
additional arguments he now raises would have persuaded the
trial court to grant a motion to suppress.

For these same reasons, Defendant cannot prove prejudice. As explained,
none of the additional arguments Defendant now raises would have persuaded
the trial court to grant a motion to suppress. Defendant has not shown that
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•

Sheets lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to briefly detain him to
conduct field sobriety tests. Defendant thus cannot demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance, if any.

Defendant

therefore fails to prove that his trial counsel was ineffective. See Kimmelman, 477
U.S. at 375.
III.
The trial court did not plainly err in appointing conflict counsel
to address a possible ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.

Defendant argues that although the trial court identified potential claims
of trial counsel ineffectiveness, it "failed to appoint counsel to represent
[Defendant] in the post-trial proceedings."

Br.Aplt. 52.

Rather, Defendant

argues that the trial court "simply appointed an attorney as amicus to address
one distinct issue for the court." Br.Aplt. 52. Defendant argues that this was
plain error because he had a right to conflict counsel who would represent him
"in a meaningful way." Br.Aplt. 52. Defendant misinterprets the record.
The State does not dispute that Defendant had a right to independent
counsel to address any post-trial claim that his h·ial counsel was ineffective.
The State disputes, however, Defendant's assertion that the trial court did not
appoint him independent counsel.
After trial, the trial court sua sponte raised two issues of possible trial
counsel ineffectiveness. R268-67. The court was concerned that trial counsel
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•
did not (1) "file any memorandum following an evidentiary hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress"; or (2) remove Juror Mangelson. R268. The
court

later

withdrew

its

concern

about

Juror

Mangelson.

R285

n.1;R441 :2;R442:4,7-8.
The court appointed conflict counsel, Mr. Tate Bennett, to represent
Defendant for purposes of the court's sua sponte notice. R274;R441:6. Bennett
filed what he .titled an" Amicus Brief" explaining that trial counsel's failure to
file a memorandum supporting the motion was not prejudicial because, once
counsel moved to suppress, the prosecution bore the burden to prove that the

•

search was lawful. R286-79. Bennett further noted that the trial court denied
the suppression motion on the merits, not merely because trial counsel failed to
file a supporting memorandum. R282.
After receiving Mr. Bennett's memo, the trial court withdrew its sua
sponte notice regarding ineffective assistance of counsel issues. R442:8-9.

The

court explained that although it was initially concerned with trial counsel's
"failure to file a memorandum" supporting the suppression motion, the court
was satisfied that the lack of a memorandum did not amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel for the reasons Bennett had explained. R442:8. The court
noted, however, that it was not ruling on whether it erred in denying the
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.

suppression motion and that trial counsel could address that potential issue in a
new trial motion. R448:9,12.
Thus, the trial court did appoint Bennett as
R274;R441:6.

independently represent Defendant.

II

conflict counsel" to
Bennett, however,

II

apparently viewed his role as only a friend of the Court." R286. But that is
Bennett's fault, not the trial court's.

If Bennett failed to effectively address

potential ineffective assistance of trial counsel issues, then Defendant's
argument should be that Bennett was ineffective, not that the trial court plainly
erred in appointing him.
But, as explained above, Defendant has not proven that his trial counsel
was ineffective in any respect. Therefore, even if Defendant had claimed that
Bennett was ineffective in his post-trial representation, Defendant still could not
have prevailed.
Nor could Defendant prevail even if this were properly viewed as a plain
error claim. Plain error requires proof of obvious, prejudicial error. State v.

Beckering, 2015 UT App 53, ,I19, 346 P.3d 672.

Defendant has not shown

prejudicial error, because he has not shown that conflict counsel could have
proven that his trial counsel was ineffective.
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IV.

This court should remand for the limited purpose of correcting a
clerical error in Defendant's sentence.

This Court should remand for the limited purpose of correcting a clerical
error in Defendant's sentence. The trial court entered Defendant's conviction
on Count II (hydrocodone possession) as a third degree felony. R295;R442:1314. But at the preliminary hearing, the prosecution amended Count II to a class
B misdemeanor. R2,27;R435:10. The trial court noted the amendment on the
original Information, but not on the Amended Information. R2,12.
The trial court imposed a 0-5 year prison sentence on Count II, but
suspended that sentence and placed Defendant on probation for 24 months.
R295-93;R442:13-14. It imposed sentence on 14 February 2013, but suspended

•

the sentence for six weeks to allow the filing of a new trial motion. R293. In
September

2014,

the

trial

court

terminated

Defendant's

probation

unsuccessfully because, although he had satisfied all other probation
conditions, Defendant had not fully paid his fines and fees. R459.
Defendant's conviction on Count II should have been entered only as a
Class B misdemeanor. This Court should remand for the limited purpose of
allowing the h·ial court to correct that clerical error. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b)
(allowing for the correction of a clerical error in a judgment "at any time").
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•

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm, but nevertheless
remand for the limited purpose of correcting the clerical error in Defendant's
sentence.
Respectfully submitted on May 13, 2015.
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1

NEPHI, UTAH - NOVEMBSR 1, 2012

2

JUDGE JAMES BRADY
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification

3

4

may not be acc~rate with audio recordings.)
P R O C E E D I N G S

5
6

BAI~IFF: The Honorable James Brady presiding.

7

THE COURT: Thank you.

8

We're here today on a case of the State of Utah vs.

9

Abisai Martinez-Castellanos.

Please be seated.

This is case number 101600146.

10

I'll note that the defendant is cresent with counsel.

-, 1

St2te is present with counsel as well.

The

12

Mr. Eldridge, is the state ready to proceed?

13

MR. ELDRIDGE: Yes, ~our Honor.

:-:_4

THE COURT: Mr. Harmon is the defendant ready to
proce ed?

•

,

::..6

M~.

=- 7

THE COURT: Tha nk you.

18

I'm going to ask the clerk now ~o go through a

19

call of those of you wh o are present just as perspective

20

=u r cr s .

21

and welcome to our cour t room.

22

time this mornin g go over a jury process, and I ' l l exolain

23

that as we go,

24

as my clerk calls y ou r name,

25

hand so ~hat I can vis~ally see who is responding and also

!!AR:"'.ION:

We are,

Your Honor.

role

First, let me say that I appreciate you being here
We're going to spend a l i ttle

but righ~ no w we need to have a r~ i e call.
~f you would, please,

Sn

raise your

1

because this is being recorded.

Would you simply indicate

2

your present by saying here or presen~ or something to that

3

affect?

4

Go ahead, Cindy.

5

COURT CLERK: Jeffrey Bradley?

6

MR. BRADLEY:

Present.

7

COURT CLERK:

Paul Mangelson?

8

MR. MANGELSON:

9

COURT CLERK: Karen Sachra?

Present.

10

MS. SACHRA: Here.

11

COURT CLERK:

12

MR. SPERRY: Here.

13

COURT CLERK: David [inaudible]

14

MR.

15

COURT CLERK: Curt Stevens?

16

MR. STEVENS: Here.

17

COU~T CLERK: Shelly Richardson?

18

MS. RICHARDSON: Here.

19

COURT CLERK: Leon Greenausch?

20

MR. LEON GR EENAUSCH: Here.

21

COURT CLERK: Robert Kauffman?

22

MR. KAUFFMAN: Here.

23

COURT CLERK:

24

MS. :SAIRD:

25

COURT CLERK: Rod ney Steel?

?:

Phil Sperry?

?

[inaudible]

Brittany L=, 1_rd,

[inaudible] .

2

•

•
•

•
•
•

,.
•

•

- - ------•--·-

------

- ·-

.

1

MR. STEEL:

2

COURT CLERK: Lucy Jones?

3

MS. JONES: Here.

4

COURT CLERK: Gary Wood?

5

MR. WOOD: Here.

6

COURT CLERK: Deborah Barnes?

7

MS . BARNES: Here.

8

COURT CLERK: Chet Farr?

9

MR. FARR: Here.

-------------

[inaudible]

10

COURT CLERK: Mitchell Durban?

11

MR. DURBAN: Here.

12

COURT CLERK: Mark [inaudible] ?

13

MR. ? : Yes.

14

COURT CLERK: Anna Gage?

15

MS. GAGE: Here.

16

COURT CLERK: Kelly Lynn?

17

MS. , LYNN: Here.

18

COURT CLERK: Mark Worthington?

19

MR. WORTHINGTON: Present.

20

COURT CLERK: Rod Greenausch?

21

MR. ROD GREENAUSH: Present.

22

COURT CLERK: Lisa Blackett?

23

MS. BLACKETT: Present.

24

COURT CLERK: Jerry Kindle?

25

MR. KINDLE: Here.

3

.L

COURT CLERK: Russell Morgan?

2

MR. MORGAN: Here.

3

COURT CLERK: Kimberly Kay?

4

MS.

5

COURT CLERK: Lisa Jacobson?

6

MS.

7

THE COURT: Thank you all very much.

8

before,

9

here.

•

KAY: Here.

JACOBSON: Here.

I appreciate your being here today.

As I indicated
We welcome you

I know that for some of you, you've set aside matters

lC

that are important to you, whether that's family,

or work,

or

11

other activities in order to make time to respond to the call

12

to serve today in this jury selection process.

13

voting, which hopefully everybody gets a chance to do here or

14

r.as already done,

'

Besides

serving on a jury is perhaps one of the

•

most interactive ways you have in being involved in our
16

conmunities government.

We often talk about the government

17

as though it's a third party.

18

government,

19

reality is today you are part of that process,

20

part of thaL government operation.

21

juror or as a juror requires a mind that 's cleansed of all

22

prejudices and biases.

Somebody out there is our

and I understand that perspective, but the
and you are

T~e role as a perspect~ve

You may be called uoon to resolve

dispu~es of facts w~c,r c differen c par ties are testifying
abcct the same event differently.

25

Yo~r role,

if you're

selected to serve on the jury, will be to function as the

•

•

•
•

•

•
•

•
•

- - - ----·----·--1

judge of those facts and determine what facts actually

2

happened.

3

your intention in this case, your mature consideration of the

4

facts,

5

to select eight jurors to hear this case.

6

so many of you here is because our experience over the years

7

indicates that we need to start with a group of about this

8

size in order to be able to select eight people to serve

9

finally as jurors.

10

and the quality of your verdict.

•

Today, we're going
The reason we have

From this group, the attorneys and I will

select those final eight.
You've filled out questionnaires, and I wanted to

11

12

express my appreciation.

13

that selection process.

14

understand that by saving us this time with those

15

questionnaires, we also respect your privacy in those

16

questionnaires and the information you provide to us in those

17

documents are kept private.

18

case should only take one day.

19

jury panel to go forward,

20

with you.

The questionnaires assist us in
I need to make sure that you

As I indicated earlier, this
After we select the final

I'll go over the daily schedule

At that point, I'm going to ask all of you various

21

•

The true measure of your service as a juror is

22

questions.

So before I ask you those questions,

23

have my clerk place you under oath to answer those questions

24

truthfully.

25

prospective jurors to please stand and raise your right hand.

So if you would,

I'm going to

I'm going to ask all of our

5

1

My clerk is going to administer an oath to all of you.

2

(Whereupon the prospective jurors were sworn)

3

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

I'm now going to

4

go over what the qualifications are to serve as a juror,

and

5

I'm going to ask if anybody feels they're not qualified.

To

6

serve as a juror, you must be 18 years of age or older.

7

must be a US ci~izen, a resident of Juab County, and be able

8

to read, write,

9

there anybody present who feels that they don't meet one or

and understand the English language.

10

more of these qualifications?

11

I'll note that nobody is raising their hand.

You

Is

If so, please raise your hand?

You are disqualified from serving on a jury if you

12
13

have been convicted of a felony or if you're serving in the

2..4

active military service and jury service would interfere with

•

your miss i on, or if you're not capable of serving because of
16

some physical or mental disability that would interfere with

~-7

your ability to sit and listen, deliberate,

_,'J

a r.

verdict in this case.

19

be disqualified from serving for one of those three reasons,

20

please raise your hand?

•

and render a

If any of you believe that you should

I ' ll note thot nobody has raised

their hand.
No qualified prospective juror is exempt for

22

jury

•

service~

24

a showing of undue hardship,

23

necessity.

extreme inconvenience, or public

A hardship must be a true hardship, and it cannot

.

6

'

•

•

•

1

be excused for slight or trivial causes.

2

excused for hardship or inconvenience to your business.

Keep

3

in mind that I anticipate this trial will take one day.

Is

4

there anybody here who believes that they should be

5

disqualified because of undue hardship, extreme

6

inconvenience, or for public necessity?

7

your hand.

•
•

•
•
I

I

If so, please raise

I'll note that nobody has raised their hand.
At this point, I'm going to acquaint you with the

8

9

You cannot be

case by reading from the information the charges that we will

10

be dealing with.

11

I'm going to ask you at a later time if you have heard of

12

this case or if you are acquainted with any of the facts of

13

this case.

14

The State of Utah vs. Abisai Martinez-Castellanos.

15

Eldridge, Juab County Attorney, state of Utah, accuses the

16

defendant, Abisai Martinez-Castellanos, of the following

17

accounts.

18

degree felony.

19

about June 9 th ,

20

intentionally possessed methamphetamine, a controlled

21

substance.

22

I'd like you to listen to these charges.

So let me make certain that you listen closely.
Jared W.

Count one, possession of methamphetamine, a third
In that Abisai Martinez-Castellanos on or
2010 in Juab County, Utah knowingly and

Count two, possession of hydrocodone, a third

23

degree felony.

In that Abisai Martinez-Castellanos on or

24

about June 9th, 2010 in Juab County, Utah knowingly and

25

intentionally possessed hydrocodone, a controlled substance.
7

'

Count three, possession of a dangerous weapon by a

l
2

category two restricted person,

a Class A misdemeanor.

In

3

that Abisai Martinez-Castellanos having been convicted or

4

under indictment for a =elony, or within the last seven years

5

having been adjudicated delinquent for an offense, which if

6

committed by an adult, would have been a violent felony,

7

is under - or is an unlawful user of a controlled substance,

8

or in poss - or is in possession of a controlled substance

9

Schedule I or II, or has been found guilty by reason of

10

insanity, not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony

11

offense, or has been dishonorably discharged from the armed

12

forces,

13

9 th ,

14

- did purchase, transfer, possess, use or had under his

15

custody or control any dangerous weapon other than a firearm.

or

or has renounced his citizenship on or about June

2010 in Juab County,

Count four,

Utah did possess, transfer, possess

•

driving with any measurable controlled
a Class G misdemeanor.

In that Abisai

17

substance in the body,

18

Martinez-Castellanos on or about June 9 th ,

19

County, Utah did operate or was in actual physical control of

20

a motor vehicle when he had any measurable controlled

21

substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in his

2010 in Juab

body.

I

A~d ca~nt f ~ve,
24

Class B misdemeanor.

25

or about June 9 th ,

poss e s s i on o f drug paraphernalia,

a

In that Abisai Martinez-Castellanos on

2Cl0 in Juab County, Utah did possess with
8

•

•
•
•

•

•
•
•

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . ·-1

the intent to use drug paraphernalia.

2

June, 2010.

3

Attorney.

4

----·

-·····- -··--•· ··

Dated this 22 nd day of

Signed by Jared W. Eldridge, Juab County

I'm now going to ask each of you to take just a

5

moment and stand and introduce yourselves to us.

We'll start

6

up here on the lefthand side with Mr. Bradley.

7

get - tell you what I need, and then I'll have you stand up,

8

but we'll start with Mr. Bradley and go across that top row,

9

come down here to Ms. Richardson, go across the front row,

Not - let me

10

then we'll move over to Ms. Jones, go across your row,

11

then we'll move back to Mr. Lynn, and go down that row.

12

I'd like you to do is to simply stand, tell us your name, the

13

community that you live in, and your employment.

14

married, give us your spouse's name and the employment that

15

your spouse has.

16

I'll be glad to go over them again with you.

If you forget these items,

just ask me,

Mr. Bradley, if you would start?

18

MR. BRADLEY: My name is Jeffrey Bradley.
[inaudible].

What

If you are

17

I'm a

and

I live in

I'm m·arried to · [inaudible].

19

Eureka.

20

work in Springville at [inaudible] Tech.

21

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Next?

22

MR. MANGELSON: Paul Mangelson.

I live in Levan,

23

Utah.

24

retired.

25

I'm retired.

My wife's name is Sandra.

and

I

She's also

I believe that's it.
THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Ms. Sachra,

is it?
9

~S.

1
2

Sachra.

3

Henry.

SACHRA: Uh-huh (affirmative).

I'm a piano teacher.
I live in

I'm retired.

THE COURT: Thank you.

5

MR. SPERRY:

Ph i l

Sperry.

6

Dorothy.

7

after 42 years in [inaudible].

8

THE COURT: Thank you.

9

MS.
Nephi.

My husband is

(Inaudible).

4

10

I'm Carolyn

I'm 70 years old.

I live in Nephi.

I 'D retired

PREVOS T: My name's Stacy Prevost.

I'm not married.

I'm widowed,

and I

THE COURT: Thank you.

12

MR. STEVENS: My name is Curt Stevens.
Capital

14

is Etta.

(inaudible) 3ank.

I 'm from

.

[inaudible].

11

13

•

My wife's name is

I work for

I am married, and my wife's name

THE COURT: Thank you.

16

MR. STEVENS:

I live in Mona.

17

THE COURT: Thank you.

18

MS.

RICHAR0SON:

:;_ 9

to Sam Richardson,

20

works at

I'm Shelly Richardson.

I'm married

and I'm a stay-at-home mother, and he

[i~audible].

~EE COURT: Thank you.
MR.

23

GREENAUSCH: Leon Greenaush.

My •.-rife j_s !<e l ly .

She wo:rk:s

I l ive in Nephi.

•

i :1 Nephi .

24

THE COURT: Thank you.

25

MR . KAUFFMAN: Bob Kauffman.

I live in Nephi.

•

I

10

•
•
•
•

1

work at NRP, and my wife's name is Barb.

2

THE COURT: Thank you.

3

MS. LAIRD: Brittany Laird, and I live in Nephi.

4

And I'm a cosmetologist, and that's all.

5

THE COURT: Thank you.

6

MR. STEEL: I'm Rod Steel.

•
•
•
I

I

I

work

7

at Novel, and I am married to Tricia who is a stay-at-home

8

mom.
THE COURT: Thank you.

9

•

I live in Nephi.

10

MS. JONES: I'm Lucy Jones from Nephi.

I'm an

11

instructional assistant at Red Cliffs Elementary School here

12

in Nephi.

13

dentist .

I'm married to Nelson Jones, and he's a retired

14

THE COURT: Thank you.

15

MR. WOOD: Gary Wood.

16

Ashco Cement.

17

[inaudible] Town.

I live in Levan.

I work for

I'm married to Stephanie, and she works for

18

THE COURT: Thank you.

19

MS. BARNES: I'm Deborah Barnes.

20

I'm a stay-at-home mom.

21

works for the LDS Church.

I'm from Mona.

My husband's Val Barnes, and he

22

THE COURT: Thank you.

23

MR. FARR: My name is Chet Farr.
I work for Big D Construction.

I live in Mona,

24

Utah.

I'm a superintendent.

25

My wife works at the Nephi Hospital as a housekeeper.

11

'

•
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR.

2
3

Nephi.

4

name' s .A.ng ie.

DURBAN:

I'm Mitch Durban.

I'm a journeyman electrician.

5

Tl-IS COURT: Thank you.

6

MR. SPELT:

7

Tooele Army Depot.

8

Shirley.

9

10
11

I'm married, and her

I'm Lawrence Spelt.

I'm retired from

I work at WalMart now.

My wife is

She sells Avon.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MS. GAGE:

I'm Anna Gage.

I live in Nephi.

I'm a

widow and retired school teacher.

12

THE COURT: Thank you.

13

MR. LYNN : Kelly Lynn.

14

I live here in

I live in Nephi .

I'm a

•

registered nurse.

15

THE COURT: Thank you.

16

MR. WORTHINGTON: My name's Mark Worthington.

17

live in Nephi.

l8

My wife's name is Jody.

I

I work for the Utah County Jail as a nurse.
She works for Nebo View Elementary

School as a teacher.
20

•

THE C00RT: Thank you .
MR.

ROD GREENAUSCH:

Rod Greenausch .

I l i ve in Nephi.

22

Eas~ Stake Consultants.

2 .'3

reoistered r; c.rse at tl :e hospital.

24

THE COURT: Thank ycu.

25

MS. BLACKETT: Lisa Blackett.

I work for

My wife's a

I live in Nephi.

•
I'm
12

•

•
·•

•
•

•
•

•
•
I

•

1

married to Morris Blackett.

2

in Delta.

3

School.

He works at Intermountain Power

I own a dance studio, and I work for Juab High

4

THE COURT: Thank you .

5

MR. KENDALL: Jared Kendall.

6

Plumbing.

7

District .

My wife's Scarlet .

She works for Juab School

8

THE COURT: Thank you.

9

MR. MORGAN: Russell Morgan.

10

wife's Betty .

I live in Nephi.

My

We're both retired.

11

THE COURT: Thank you .

12

MS. KAY: Kim Kay.

13

I work for Tarr

Mona, Utah, and I do mortgage

lending.

14

THE COURT: Thank you.

15

MS. JACOBSON: I'm Lisa Jacobson.

I live in Nephi.

16

My husband's Brian.

17

company, and I'm a stay-at-home mom, except on Tuesdays I do

18

our payroll.

19

We own Sunset Rental, a fabrication

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

As jurors in this

20

case, you will be the sole triers of the fact.

This means

21

that you're going to determine what the true facts in this

22

matter are.

23

constitutional and statutory duty is to preside over this

24

case to see that the law and procedures are followed and to

25

instruct you on - as jurors on what the law is that's

As the judge, I'm referred to as the court.

My

13

t

applicable to tiis case.

I do not personally create this

2

law.

3

our federal constitution, our state constitution, and the

4

acts of our legislators in passing their laws as well as the

5

laws that are interpreted by supreme courts and courts of

6

appeal.

7

I tell you as to what the law is, regardless of what you

8

personally believe the law is or ought to be?

9

raise your hand.

I simply instruct on what the law is as set forth in

Are you willing to accept all of the statements that

If not, please

Nobody has raised their hand.

Under our constitutional system of justice, a

10
11

person is presumed in~ocent unless they are proven guilty

12

beyond a reasonable doubt.

13

proof known in the law.

14

charged with a crime is not evidence that that person has

15

cormnitted a crime, and it creates no presumption that the

16

person has com~itted a crime.

17

with or has any problems with the principle that I just

18

stated?

19

nobody has raised their hand.

20

•

This is the highest standard of

The mere fact that somebody has been

•

Is there anybody wjo disagrees

If so, please raise your hand.

I'll note that

If chosen as a juror, yo u must try this case solely

21

upon the evidence that's provided by witnesses appearing

22

before you and the exhibits or physical evidence that's

:n

presen~ed in this cour~r~om today.

24

a n y information that's obtained outside of the testimony and

25

the exhibits presented in this case.

•
•

You a re not to rely on

If there's anybody who
14

. -

-+·- --

- - - - - - - -- ·· ·- - - ···--·

•

1

believes they cannot try a case solely based on testimony and

2

evidence presented in this courtroom today, please raise your

3

hand?

I' ll note that nobody has raised their hand.

4

"

I'm r.ow going to ask the attorneys in this case to

5

stand and introduce themselves.

6

they represent,

7

call,

8

are ttat work with the m.

9

introduce themselves,

I want them to describe who

and also state what witnesses they intend to

and I'll also ta lk about who their associated attorneys
Listen closely, because after they

their witnesses, and their ass oc iated

10

attorneys, I'm going to ask you about how you might know

11

these people or might have some relationship to them.
So let's begin with the State.

12

MR.

14

r:.:::..dridge.

~LDRIDGE: Thank you.

My name is Jared

I'~ the Jua b County Attorney.

representing the state in ttis c ase today.

"

Mr. Eldridge?

I'Jl be
As far as

we only intend to call one witness today,

16

w~tnesses go,

17

that would be Trooper John Sh e ets, who is s~tting here.

18

attorneys that are ass ociated with our office, we have Ann

19

Marie iioward, who used to be Ann Mar ie Trompvine for those of

2C

yo u who have been here a while .

2 2.

part ~ime ba sis .

... '
oi:r:._ce.
~

And

She works in our off ic e on a

We also have Perry

He's married to Mo lly .

and

□ ~vis

who works in our

It used ~o be Molly Pai~ter

for ~h os e of you wha kno~ the ~a~nccr fa ~i ly,

a~d he alsc

2(

works in our office , al t hoJg h he's been recent l y activated,

25

he's serv i ng in Haw ai i

right now .
15

)-

- -- -- -

--

..

-

--

.

1

THE COURT: Thank you.

2

Mr. Harmon?

3

MR. HARMON: My name is Milton Harmon.

I am the

4

defense attorney in this case and represent my client, Abis2i

5

Martinez-Castellanos, a~d I don't speak Spanish well.

6

can't pronounce his name exactly, but that's the way I say

7

it, and Mr. Castellanos will be testifying in his own behalf.

8

THE COURT: Thank you.

9

Now,

So I

I need to ask of the prospective jurors if any

10

of you are related by blood or as an in-law to any party,

11

witness, attorney, or associated attorney in this case?

J2

so, please raise your hand.

13

their hand .

14

If

I'll note that nobody has raised

Do any of you have a professional, business or

15

financial relationship to any party , witness, at~orney,

16

attorneys associate?

or

These relationships can include such

associations as debtor/creditor, employer/employee, partner ,
18

landlord/tenant, or so on.

l9

relatio~ship with any of the parties, witnesses, attorneys,

20

or associate attorneys,

2 J.

that nobody tas raised their hand.

22

If any of you have such a

please raise your hand?

0o any of you have a soc i al,

I'll not

religious,

neig~borly,

24

witnesses, attorneys, or assccia~e attorneys that you were

25

introduced to?

If so, please raise your hand.

I

I see a

16

"
1

co~ple of hands coming up.

2

these down,

3

You're Mr. Sperry?

Yes.

5

THE COURT: Thank ycu, Mr. Spe r ry.

6

As I ask these questions and as you raise your

SPERRY:

7

hands,

we're just going to make note of that.

8

to ask you co describe anything in open court right now.

9

may be that the attorneys will want to ask you more questions
about that later.

11

some privacy and discuss it.

1

So, Mr. Sperry,

r

you've indicated yes to this

Did I see another hand over here?

15

be Ms. Richardson?

16

side of the room?

17

the room,

18

Farr?

19

you.

20

row,

21

Mor gan?

22

very mu::::h.

Is that correct?

Okay.

No .

Mr.

Durban?

And that would

Anybody else on th i s

Turning over to the ot~er side of

I saw quite a few hands.

Mr. Wood, and is t hat Mr .

Is tha~ correct, Mr. Durban?

Anyb o dy else en the front rcw?
I see Mr. Greenausch,

Okay .

And Ms. Jacobson?

Is there anybody who has a relationship,

whose ~aie I have~'t callPd?

Thank

Then o n the back

and is t ha t Mr. Kendal?

Thank you, Mr. Mo rgan.

ju3~ described,

25

It

question.

'-.!

24

I'rn not going

We'll go into a place where we can have

10

1.

'

Is that correct?

MR.

13

•

I'm going to go through it kind of orderly.

4

12

•

Just s o that I can ma r k all of

0:-<:2y,

No .

Mr.

Thank you
as I've
I h~nk

you.
Do any of y ou hav e a relationship with any o ther
17

,

1

prospective juror in this courtroom where you have a position

2

of authority over that prospective juror or they have a

3

position of authority over you,

4

or in organizations, or otherwise?

5

hand.

such as at work, at church,
If so, please raise your

I'll note that nobody has raised their hand.
Do any of you have a family member or a close

6
7

personal friend who is a law enforcement officer or works for

8

a law enforcement department?

9

Okay.

If so, please raise your hand.

Mr. Sperry and Ms. Laird; is that correct?

Anybody

10

else on this side?

Then we'll go over to the other side.

11

Ms. Jones,

12

be Mr. Bell?

Thank you, Mr. Bell,

13

Wor t hington.

Anybody else whose hand is raised whose name I

14

didn't call?

~hank you.

I see your hand.

Mr. Wood,

your hand.

That would

•

and Mr. Lynn, Mr.

Have you, a family member, or a close personal

15
16

friend been a victiili of a crime?

17

hand.

18

this side?

19

fro~t row Mr.

20

Kendal,

21

haven't ca1l e d?

22

close persona ~ friend be e n a defendant in a criminal case?

23

If so, ~l e ase raise your hand.

Ms.

Sachra, ~r. Sperry.

If so, please raise your
Thank you.

'

Anybody else on

Then going over to the other side I see on the
Bell.

and Ms.

Kay.

On the back row I see Ms. Blackett,

:s

that correct?

Thank you.

~a v e you,

Mr.

Anybody whose name I
a fam i ly member,

Mr . Ste e l.

Is that Mr.

or a

•

Farr?

FARR: Yes.

24

MR.

25

THE COURT: Thank you.

•

18

1
2

I see Ms. Jacobson stand.
I haven't called?

Thank you.

Please raise your r.and if because of hearing about

3

"'

Anybody else whose na~e

4

this case outside of court, you have any knowledge of the

5

facts involved or have formed er expressed an opinion with

6

respect to this case or the facts in this case.

7

that nobody has raised their hand.
Have any of you previously served on a jury?

8

9

10

I'll note

so, please raise your hand.

I

see Ms. Gage.

If

Ms. Gage,

may I

just ask was it a civil or a cri~inal jury?

ll

MS. GAGE: Criminal.

12

THE COURT: And how long ago was that?

13

MS. GAGE: About five years ago.

THE COURT: And where was that?
15

MS. GAGE: Bakersfield, California.

16

THE COURT: Thank you.

17

Anybody else?

18

,,

MS. BLACKETT: Uh-huh

20

THE COURT: And,

•

and

that's Ms. Blackett's?

19

21

,

I see another hand back here,

(a ~ fi rma t ive).

Ms. B~ackett, how long ago was

that?
MS. BLACKETT: =twa s probably about 1 5 years ago.

24

MS. BLACKETT:

~twas criminal and here.

25

THE COURT: Yo~ said that was here in Nephi?

•
l

MS. BLACKETT: Uh-huh

2

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

3

(affirmative).
Anybody else?

Thank

you.
Have you,

4

a family member,

or a close friend been

5

involved with the same alleged conduct which is charged in

6

this case?

7

Provos-c.

8

me.

If so, please raise your hand.
~s that correct?

I 'm sorry.

Ms.

A~ybody else?

That would be Ms.
I see Ms.

-

excuse

Blackett's hand.

MS. BLACKETT: Yes.

9

10

THE COURT: Thank yo~.

11

The question is whether you, a family member,

or a

12

close friend has been involve with the same kind of conduct

13

that is being discussed in this case?

14

also.

15

Thank you.

16

Anybody else?

I see Ms.

Okay.

So Ms.

Sachra

Kay and Ms. Jacobson's hands.

Anybody else whose name I haven't called?

•

•

Okay.

~he statement of counsel -- the s~atements of

17

counsel and their questions are not evidence, and they're not

18

to be considered as evidence.

19

is only the testimony and exhibits presented to you by the

20

witnesses inside the courtroo~ .

21

there's any reason best known to you why you could not try

22

this case fairly and impartially based solely on the evidence

23

iv i t h u u L. a r1 y ;) i a s o r p re j u di c e: :C v r

24

I ' l l note that no hands have been raised.

25

•

•

The evidence you will consider

•

Please raise your hand lf

or a g c. i n s t

If you were a party in this case, either the s~ate
20

•

"
1

or the defendant, wo~ld you be fully satisfied to have you~

2

case tried by a person of your present attitude and frame of

3

mind towards this case?

4

I'll note that no hands were raised.

s

If not, please raise your hand.

Counsel, tjat concludes the voir dire that I'm

6

going to conduct in co~rt.

7

jury,

8

my chambers, and they will determine any additional questions

9

that they'd like to ask.

They may ask questions of each of

10

you or only some of yoc.

You're free to walk about,

11

your legs.

12

you.

13

fact that we're here on ttis case with each other while we're

14

taking this break.

You can talk about the weather.

15

talk about snorts.

You can talk about anything else,

1 ,-

let's not discuss this case at this time.

_j_

C

For members o= the prospective

I'm going to take a break now and meet with counsel in

stretch

Stay in the courtroom, because we may be calling

I'm going to ask you to not discuss this case or the

You can
but

I will be in a

brief recess until we come back in, which may be in a few
minutes.

18

"

Counsel, if you'll just join me back in my

J. 9

chambers,

20
21

(PROCEEDINGS IN CHAMBERS)

I

•

THE COURT: You ca n certainly call him in and ask
hin .

,

I'd a9preciate it.

Whc de ;o~ wan~ t o start wi~h?

24

COURT CLERK: ~r. Bradley?

2.5

THE COURT: Counsel may have a few questions for
21

,

1

you.

2

TIME 9:38:52 TO 10:31:59 (Microphone left open in courtroom

3

overlapping chamber audio,

4

to be unintelligible.

rendering proceedings in chambers

•

PROCEEDINGS IN OPEN COURT

5

THE COURT: Thank you.

6

Please be seated.

We

7

appreciate your patience.

The processes we go through may be

8

a little bit deliberate and slow, but they're done for a

9

reason.

This is the time now for what we refer to as the

10

peremptory challenges.

Counsel is going to review the list

11

of p~ospective jurors.

They're going ~o make so8e

12

selections.

13

I ' l l announce those who are going to be remaining as jurors

14

and those who will be excused.

Eventually,

they'll return that list to me,

and

15

While they're going through ~his process,

16

take this time just to inform you a li ttle bit about the jury

17

process, because there are some very comrron questions that

18

people have.

19

people oftentimes thi~ks that a jury consists of 12 jurors,

20

and that may be what happens because we watch movies,

21

read books,

I'll address those questions.

and watch TV shows.

•

•

I tend to

I know that

and

'

The reality is that most of

the ju ries that are called are not 12.

In Utah, we do

rc~ervc the right to a 12-member j ur y panels,

bu t

chat's only

24

for the most serious of all criminal types of cases.

25

Generally speaking, ~ost juries consist of eight.

Sometimes

I

•
•

•
•

•

'
'
I

-··---·-··-- - - - -

1

juries might consist of six.

2

consist of four jurors, and it depends on the nature of the

3

issues that are being resolved and the severity of the crimes

4

that are charged exactly how we determine the number of

5

jurors.

6

- an eight person jury.

We even have juries that

So in this case today, it will be an eight-man jury

The other question that sometimes comes up is is it

7

8

necessary for all of the jurors to agree, or is it adequate

9

just to have a majority of the jurors?

And I'll tell you

10

that in a civil case, the majority of the jurors can make a

11

determination.

12

verdict.

13

probably seen or heard or read about cases where they talk

14

about a jury that can't come to a unanimous decision as being

15

a hung jury.

16

have, however many jurors we have, that they come to a

17

unanimous decision before we can announce a verdict, and

18

that's part of the deliberation process, and I'll discuss

19

that a little bit further when we get jury instructions to

20

you.

21

counsel to make their decisions, and so we'll pass this time

22

kind of quietly meditating.

23

proceed.

24
25

In a criminal case, it takes a unanimous

All jurors must come to an agreement, and you've

So in criminal cases, it does require that we

At this time, we really will just be waiting for

And when they're through,

I'll

(10:34:24 to 10:41:30 no proceedings)
THE COURT: Thank you.
23

•
I'll now call off the names of those who will

1
2

remain as jurors.

3

let me tell you thank you for the time that you have served.

4

Your presence here has made it possible for us to seat a

5

today.

6

not remaining.

7

others will be Mr. Manglesen, Ms.

8

Prevost, Mr. Steel, Ms. Jones, Mr.

9

I have not called your name,

If I don't call your name,

At an appropriate time,

then in advance

•

jury

•

I will excuse those who are

But those who will remain when I excuse the
Sachra, Mr. Sperry,
Farr, and Mr.

Ms.

Durban.

If

thank you very much for your

10

time spent this morning allowing us to select this jury.

11

We'll excuse you now and with our appreciation.

•

Thank you.

12

BAILIFF: All arise.

13

(Whereupon the excused jurors left the courtroom).

14

THE COURT: If I could have Ms. Jones,

Mr.

Farr,

and

•

Durban - if I could have the three of you come over here?

15

Mr.

lE

I'll have my bailiff seat you.

If you'll take - starting
I

17

with Mr. Manglesen whose number one in the four chairs to the

18

right on the back row and then the front row?

19

(Whereupon the jury was seated)

20

THE COURT: Thank you.

21

Counsel, does ~his constitute the jury you

22

•

Please be seated.

selected?
M~. ELDRIDGE: Yes , Yo ur

24

MR. HARMON:

25

THE COURT: Very well.

'

Wnnn-.

Yes.
I'm going to have the clerk

24

1

now take a mo~ent and have you all be adminislered a

2

different oath.

3

questions concerning your qualifications.

4

to take an oath as the juror selected.

5

oath.

Previously,

you took an oath to answer

Go aheaci.

7

If you'd all rise and raise your right hand?
(Whereupon the jury was sworn)
THE COURT: Thank you.

Please be seated.

10

going to take a brief recess.

ll

need to,

12

are any that need to be made,

~3

restroom,

14

evidence as soon as you retu ~n.

15

11:00.

·, 7
'

Tiat will allow you,

to make phone calls, to make arrangements,

get a drink.

Counsel, do

16

stretch your legs,

We're now
if you
l'+
.L

there

go to the

We'll start in in earnest with our

wR

:t's now almost quarter to

need 10 or 15 minutes?

What would

you suggest?
MR. ELDRIDGE:

18

Te n minutes should be enough.

THS COURT: Ten minutes?

,

It's a different

6

9

•

you're going

So listen to what it is she's asking you to say.

8

J.

Now,

If I could have everybody

20

back here then at five minutes ~ o 11:00,

21

t rial at th a t

time.

During any re c ess,

22

whethe~ it's t his one or any

, , --,
L..J

o the r,

24

about sports, weather, oublic interests,

25

activities, Halloween, whatever you want.

•••.••

~

j'-_iV..

I

,,. ..-.

.L·.:-::

we'll begin our

~

'

'r-~, ,......,_; , t-

; )

'' .·

\ .(

,_. /

co,nmuni-r..y
Just not about
25

,

•
1

this case, and you'll hear from me in just a moment other

2

instructions I'll give you.

3

regarding this case with any of the parties, witnesses,

4

attorneys in the case, or my staff.

5

bailiff if you need directions to facilities in the building,

6

but not to discuss the case.

7

excuse the jury, and we'll be in recess for another 10

8

minutes.

Okay?

or

You can always ask the

With that in mind,

•

we'll

•
THE COURT: The jury's excused.

9

10

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom).

11

THE COURT: Counsel, are there any items that you

12

•

You're not to discuss anything

•

would like to place on the record before we begin?

13

MR. HARMON: None from the defense.

14

THE COURT: Okay.

15

MR. ELDRIDGE: None.

16

THE COURT: We'll be in recess then for another 10

•
I

17

minutes.

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

18

THE COU~T: Thank you.

19
20
,., -

L-

22

Thank you.

The jury is back.

Please be

'

s ea-:ed.
Memb e rs of the jury, as you've returned to your
sea t s, you'll see that we 've left a copy of pre l i minary jury
fer ~{on on :.,,rour se a t.

It's

24

instruct you en the laws, not only as to the case, but also

25

as to the procedures that we follow.

So if you'll read along
26
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DECLARATION OF
MILTON T. HARMON

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

No. 20130432-CA

V.

ABISAI MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS.
Defendant/Appellant.

Fourth Judicial District Court
Case No. 101600146

I, Milton T. Harmon, declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the
foregoing is true and correct:
1.

I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. I

represented Abisai Martinez-Castellanos in the above-referenced proceedings in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Case No. 101600146.
2.

I have reviewed portions of the record in the district court file including

record excerpts relating to jury selection and the examination of witnesses. No transcript
or report is available for three points in the proceedings.
3.

First, no transcript or report is available for portions of the jury voir

dire and selection. The trial transcript indicates that during voir dire, the microphone

•
was left open in the courtroom, "rendering the proceedings in chambers to be
unintelligible" for approximately one hour of time-from 9:38:52 to 10:31:59. (Trial

•

Transcript at 22.) As a result, there is no record of follow up questions to prospective
jurors.

•
4.

I am providing this statement of the proceedings based on my best

recollection.

a.

After Judge Brady asked general questions to the jury pool, he

•

requested that Mr. Eldridge and I join him in chambers to ask follow up questions of
selective venire members. (Trial Transcript at 21.) My client, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos,
was not invited in chambers.
b.

While in chambers, Judge Brady went through the list of prospective

jurors. He read each name and asked if either Mr. Eldridge or I had follow-up questions
for the prospective juror. After the judge had compiled the list of individuals we wished
to question, he invited each prospective juror on the list into chambers one at a time.
c.

I

Although I do not have a specific recollection of the circumstances

surrounding the individual questioning of some of the prospective jurors, Judge Brady
generally proceeded in the same fashion. He would explain the process to the prospective

•

juror and then invite Mr. Eldridge or me to ask our questions. The prospective juror
would answer and after we completed our questioning, Judge Brady asked the juror ifhe
or she could be fair and impartial. The judge then excused the individual and asked if the

•

attorneys had any objections or whether we passed the prospective juror for cause.

'
2

'

d.

To the best of my recollection, the following prospective jurors were

called into Judge Brady's chambers for questioning: Paul Mangelson, Carolyn Sachra,
Phil Sperry, Shelly Richardson, Brittany Laird, Rodney Steele, Lucy Jones, Gary Wood,
Chet Farr, and Mitchell Durbin. There may have been others but I do not recall anything
about them.
e.

I do not remember any particular in-chambers discussion between

Judge Brady, Mr. Eldridge, and me about the individuals listed in paragraph 4.d. either
before each individual entered the judge's chambers or after they left. I do remember
generally why each prospective juror was called into chambers for further questioning.
But I do not remember who asked the questions, I do not remember the specific
questions, and I do not recall each prospective juror's answers.

"

f.

I do recall the following as to the list of prospective juror and the

missing portions of the voir dire and jury selection.
1.

Judge Brady called Paul Mangelsori into chambers for further

questioning . .Although I don' t remember who, someone expressed concern about Mr.
Mangelson's many years of experience as a highway patrolman and his past involvement
in so many jury trials. I do not remember any specific questions or answers, but Paul
Mangelson would have assured us that he knew how to be fair, and that he could be fair,
if selected as a juror. After Mr. Mangelson left the judge's chambers, I do not recall that
we had any particular discussion about him although I recall that he was passed for cause.
In addition, I did not object to Mr. Mangelson serving on the jury because he had been a
supervisor on highway patrol when I was a district attorney for Juab County. I knew he

3
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•
had done a lot of work on freeway stops and I thought he would hear the evidence of how
this stop occurred and know that it was not proper.
11.

•

Judge Brady called prospective jurors into chambers because

they indicated during general questioning that they were acquainted with someone in law

•

enforcement. I believe those jurors included Phil Sperry, Brittney Laird, Rodney Steele,
Lucy Jones, Gary Wood, and Mitchell Durbin, who had also served previously as a juror
in a criminal case. For most of those individuals, I cannot recall what they were asked

•

and I cannot recall their responses. I do not recall any of the details of Mr. Durbin's
previous service as a juror. I do have some specific recollections about two of the
prospective jurors-Phil Sperry and Lucy Jones.
m.

Phil Sperry disclosed that he is a good friend of Paul

Mangelson and acquainted with law enforcement. I believe I asked if he could be fair and
impartial. I do not recall anything else about Phil Sperry.
1v.

As to Lucy Jones, I recall that during in-chambers

questioning, she was quite reluctant to disclose what was going on in her own mind. I
recall that when Judge Brady asked whether she could be fair and impartial, she had
reservations about her ability to function as a juror. Because of her reluctance, Judge
Brady asked the question a second time, and Ms. Jones replied that she understood what
the judge wanted and she believed she could serve as a juror. After Ms. Jones left the
I

judge's chambers, no one objected to her service as a juror and she was passed for cause.
v.

Four prospective jurors were called into chambers for

questioning because they indicated they had been or were related to victims of crime or

4

•

were otherwise familiar with the criminal justice system. Those jurors included Carolyn
Sachra, Phil Sperry, Shelly Richardson, and Chet Farr. I do not have any specific
recollection of questioning those prospective jurors, but I do recall that Phil Sperry
disclosed that his daughter had been a victim of crime and the crime occurred at his
home. In addition, Shelly Richardson ran a business in town and she had been a victim of
a crime. One of her employees committed theft. I believe Mr. Eldridge asked if she was
satisfied with how his office had handled the case. I do not recall her answers. I believe
Judge Brady asked if she could be fair and impartial and she said she could. Also, Chet
Farr's son had been involved with criminal law either as a victim or perpetrator. I believe

Mr. Eldridge asked if Mr. Farr was satisfied with how the prosecution handled the case. I
do not recall Mr. Farr's answer.
v1.

After reviewing my notes, I recall that I exercised 4

peremptory strikes to exclude the following individuals from the jury: Jeffrey Bradley,
Kert Stevens, Ryan Greenhalgh, and Gary Wood. I have no recollection as to why I
wanted any of these individuals excluded from the jury.
5.

I do not recall that I had any conversations with my client about any part of

the jury selection process. He was not in chambers and not involved in the process.
6.

,

Second, no recording or transcript is available for several minutes

after the court took a recess at the conclusion of Trooper Sheets's testimony and
during a portion of Mr. Martinez-Castellanos's testimony. The record of the trial
proceedings shows that from 2:13:02 to 2:47:43, for more than 34 minutes, the recording

,

equipment was off. During that period, "a recess was taken." The trial transcript states

5
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•
the following: "Docket shows further examination of Mr. Sheets at 2:32 and testimony of

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos starting at 2:34 indicating 15 minutes of lost court audio."

•

(Trial Transcript at 126.)
a.

As to those proceedings, I have no recollection of whether a juror

•

had a question of Trooper Sheets or whether Judge Brady asked a question on behalf of a
juror after the recess.
b.

As to the missing portions of Mr. Martinez-Castellanos's direct

examination, I do not recall specifics, but to the best of my recollection, I would have
asked him his name, where he lived, how he came to possess the car he was driving, and
how long he had owned the car before driving to Utah. I asked him to describe the
condition of the car and whether he took time to clean it after buying it. I also asked
whether he was aware of any drugs in the car; and I asked him to describe the drive and
his encounter with the officer.
C.

To the best of my recollection, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos answered

•

as follows:

i.

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos lived in California. He worked in a

warehouse and used box cutters and a pocket knife in his work.
n.

'

He had family in Utah and his brother was going to school

here. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was proud of him.
I

iii.

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was traveling here for his brother's

graduation. He needed a working car and he found one at a dealership.

•
6

1v.

The dealer told him the car was recently brought in and the

dealer did not have time to clean it.
v.

Although the car was quite cluttered, Mr. Martinez-

Castellanos decided to buy it to give to his brother as a gift. He paid $400 for the car.
Also, he did not have time to clean it.
vi.

"

On June 9, 2010, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos left for Utah

immediately after he worked a long shift at the warehouse. He did not pack much and he
placed items in the console, including the box cutter, the pocketknife, a lighter and a
marijuana grinder.
v11.

To keep himself alert, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos stopped at a

truck stop/ gas station and purchased an energy drink for the drive, either Red Bull or
Rock Stars. He drank the energy drink while he was on the road.
viii.

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos described how he was traveling

northbound on I-15 and a Utah trooper was traveling southbound when the trooper made
a U-tum with lights engaged to follow Mr. Martinez-Castellanos. In addition, he
described how the trooper drove beside him and then pulled back behind Mr. MartinezCastellanos with his lights on to signal a traffic stop. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos pulled
onto the shoulder of the interstate.
ix.

He described that later, after the trooper asked him to get out

of the car, he told the trooper about his box cutter, the pocketknife, and his marijuana
grinder and lighter in the console. He acknowledged to the officer that those items

7
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•
belonged to him and he explained that he had permission from a California doctor to use
medical marijuana, where it is legal in that state.
x.

•

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos testified that other items found in

the car, including a white substance wrapped in paper, pills, cellophane with residue, a

•

twist, and a glass pipe with white residue did not belong to him.
x1.

He explained that many of the items in the car were there

along with the clutter when he purchased the car.
d.

I observed from the trial transcript that when the recording starts

again after recess, the discussion on the record concerns a certain Exhibit 14--my client's

•

medical marijuana prescription. I do not recall how this discussion was initiated, nor do I
remember any conversations on or off the record involving this exhibit.
7.

Third, no recording or transcript is available for a post-trial

conference in Judge Brady's chambers. My best recollection of those proceedings is as

follows:
a.

After the trial, I filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the

'

Verdict. I did not file a memorandum supporting this motion because I did not have time
to prepare one. As a public defender, I have a very high case load.
b.

Sometime after I filed my motion, during a regular court session,

Judge Brady asked the prosecutor and me to join him in chambers to discuss concerns he
I

had with the jury trial. Once in chambers, the judge voiced two concerns. First, the
judge expressed concern that Paul Mangelson served on the jury and that I did not strike
him. Second, the judge expressed concern that the trooper who testified at trial may not

8

'

have had a legal justification for a search and seizure. Judge Brady was also concerned
that I did not do more at the trial to bring this fact to light.
c.

Although Judge Brady gave both the prosecutor and me an

opportunity to respond, I do not recall what, if anything, either of us said.
d.

I later learned that Judge Brady spoke to another public defender,

Tate Bennett, and he asked Mr. Bennett to prepare an amicus brief for the court.

Executed on this

/~'!"'day of February, 2014.

,
,

•
,
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•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the l-0.\v--day of February, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy

•

of the foregoing Declaration of Milton T. Harmon to be served on the following via
first-class mail, postage prepaid:

•

Laura B. Dupaix
Office of the Utah Attorney General
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

'

•
'

'
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V.

ABISAI !viARTINEZ-CASTELLAl~OS.
Defendant/Appellant.

Fourth Judicial District Court
Case No. 101600146

I, Jared W. Eldridge, declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the
foregoing is true and correct:
1.

I am County Attorney for Juab County and duly licensed to practice law in

the State of Utah. I represented the State of Utah in the above-referenced proceedings in
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Case No. 101600146.
2.

I have reviewed portions of the record in the district court file including

record excerpts relating to jury selection and the examination of witnesses and my notes.

"

No transcript or report is available for two points in the proceedings.

3.

First, no transcript or report is available for portions of the jury vofr

dire and selection. After Judge Brady asked general questions of the jury pool, he

•
requested that counsel join him in chambers to ask follow up questions of selective venire
members. (Trial Transcript at 21.) At that point, the trial transcript indicates that during

•

voir dire, the microphone was left open in the courtroom, "rendering the proceedings in
chambers to be unintelligible" for approxi~ately one hour of time-from 9:38:52 to
10:31 :59'. (Trial Transcript at 22.) As a result, there is no record of follow up questions
to prospective jurors.

4.

I am providing this statement of the proceedings based on my best

•

recollection.
5.

I believe that while we were in chambers, Judge Brady went down the list

of prospective jurors and asked the attorneys if they had questions for anyone on the list.
Ifwe did, the judge would call that person into chambers for questioning. The inchambers proceedings then continued generally as follows.
6.

•

Either Mr. Harmon or I would ask the prospective juror our questions and

after he or she answered, the judge would excuse the individual and ask Mr. Hannon and
me if we had any concerns with this particular person serving on the jury. If we did not
express concerns, that individual remained on the jury list and Judge Brady called the
next person into chambers for further questioning.
a.

I believe Judge Brady called juror number one, Jeffry Bradley, into

chambers. Although I do not recall anything about Mr. Bradley, I believe he disclosed
that a family member was charged with a crime. I may have asked about his experience

•

with the criminal justice system and whether he felt either that he was treated fairly or
that his family member was treated fairly. I do not have a specific recollection of his

•

2

'

answers. Because I did not object to him, I believe he expressed that he felt the process
was fair. Ifhe had answered otherwise, after Mr. Bradley left chambers I would have
asked the judge to strike him for cause.
b.

I believe Judge Brady next called Paul Mangelson into chambers for

I

further questioning. I recall that the questions involved his work as a trooper for
approximately 40 years and his assignments relating to drug interdiction. I may have
asked Mr. Mangelson if, in his capacity as a sergeant, he supervised Trooper John Sheets.
He disclosed that he knew Trooper Sheets but did not supervise him. I believe Mr.
Harmon asked Mr. Mangelson ifhe would give Trooper Sheets's testimony more weight.
Also, the judge may have asked follow-up questions, but I do not recall. I do recall that

Mr. Mangelson said he would make up his mind based on the facts presented in court and
he would not give the officer's testimony more weight. After Mr. Mangelson left, he
remained on the list of jurors as I had no reason to ask the judge to strike him.
c.

'

Judge Brady next called Carolyn Sachra into chambers for further

questioning. She indicated she was a victim of rape. In addition, her son had been
prosecuted in California for drugs. She said she was against drugs. She also said that if a
person had drugs in the car, they were probably guilty. After Ms. Sachra left, I do not
recall any conversation about striking her for cause.
d.

Judge Brady called Phil Sperry into chambers. He has multiple

sclerosis and I recall we had a conversation about his cane because the handle is a
baseball. Mr. Sperry is in Mr. Harmon's LDS Ward. Either he or Mr. Harmon disclosed
they had known each other for years. I believe I asked whether Mr. Sperry could make a

3
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decision based on the facts and not on his relationship with Mr. Harmon. I may have
asked, "if you thought the evidence was sufficient, if you thought the client was guilty,
would you feel you have to explain yourself to Mr. Harmon?" I recall that he answered
no. Also, Mr. Sperry revealed that his daughter was a dispatcher in law enforcement. I
believe I would have asked if he would consider a witness in law enforcement to be more
credible. I believe he would have said no. Mr. Sperry also disclosed that he was a victim
of crime or he was related to a victim, but I do not remember the crime. I may have asked
him whether he felt that the criminal justice system worked or whether it left a bad taste
in his mouth. I believe he gave an innocuous answer.
e.

Judge Brady called Stacey Provost into chambers. She is a widow.

She indicated she is a former drug user. Although she had used methamphetamine and
pain medications, she had been clean for 6 years. I believe I asked whether she had an
opinion about legalizing drugs. She expressed that medical marijuana should be okay.

f.

Judge Brady called Shelly Richardson into chambers. I do not recall

the specifics but believe she knew Mr. Harmon socially.
g.

Judge Brady called Brittney Laird into chambers. During the in-

chambers discussion, it came out that her ex-husband is a former highway patrolman. He

.

worked with Paul Mangelson and John Sheets, and he left the force under a cloud of
suspicion. He has had issues with substance abuse. I believe I asked her questions about
prosecuting him for violating a protective order. Also, I believe someone asked her
whether she knew Mr. Mangelson or Trooper John Sheets. I do not recall her answers

.
4

•

although I believe she would have said that she would make a decision in the case based
I

on the facts.
h.

,

Judge Brady called Rodney Steele into chambers. During the

discussion, he indicated he had been convicted twenty-two years ago of poaching. I do
not have a specific recollection, but I believe he expressed he was treated fairly.
1.

Judge Brady called Lucy Jones into chambers. During the

discussion, it came out that she is either related to or close friends with the Chief of
Police for Nephi City, Mike Morgan. I believe someone asked whether that relationship
would cause her to give more credibility to law enforcement. I do not recall her answer
but believe she said it would not influence her.
J.

Judge Brady called Gary Wood into chambers. It came out that Mr.

Wood had social relationships with the attorneys and associations with law enforcement.
He served as an LDS bishop when I served as an LDS Stake Young Men's President and

Mr. Hannon was Stake Sunday School President. I believe I asked whether Mr. Wood's
relationships and associations would cause him to lean one way or another; whether he
would feel a need to justify himself if he believed the evidence was not sufficient to
convict; and whether he would consider testimony from law enforcement to be more
credible than testimony from a fay witness. I do not recall his answers but I believe he
answered no.
II

k.

I believe Judge Brady called Debra Barnes into chambers. She

disclosed that her daughter was a victim of sexual assault. I believe we talked about that.
I would have asked about her feelings for the prosecution and whether the sexual assault

5
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case left a bad taste in her mouth. I do not remember her response, but I recall it did not
cause me to be concerned in any way.
L

Judge Brady called Chet Farr into chambers. His son had been

criminally charged. I believe I asked whether he felt his son was treated fairly. Mr. Farr
answered, yes, that his son should be held accountable for what he had done.
m.

Judge Brady also called Mitchell Durbin into chambers. I know Mr.

Durbin as a referee for church basketball~ Mr. Durbin may also have an association with
Mr. Harmon or law enforcement. I do not recall anything in particular about the inchambers discussion with Mr. Durbin.
7.

After we completed the in-chambers voir dire with the prospective jurors,

the judge would have asked whether we passed each prospective juror for cause. I do not
have a specific recollection of that conversation, but that is how the judge normally
would proceed. I recall we had a discussion as to whether we needed to talk to any
additional prospective jurors or if we had enough jurors to exercise peremptory

.

challenges and to seat an eight-person jury. We all agreed that we had talked to enough
prospective jurors. The judge then asked whether we passed the panel for cause, and he
requested that we return to the courtroom to finish jury selection.

8.

Second, no recording or transcript is available for several minutes

after the court took a recess at the conclusion of Trnoper Sheets's testimony and

.

during portions of Mr. Martinez-Castell.anos's testimony. The record of the trial
proceedings shows that from 2:13:02 to 2:47:4-3, for more than 34 minutes, the recording
equipment was off. During that period, "a recess was taken." The trial transcript states

6
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the following: "Docket shows further examination of Mr. Sheets at 2:32 and testimony of

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos starting at 2:34 indicating 15 minutes of lost court audio."
(Trial Transcript at 126.)
9.

I have reviewed the transcript pages at issue and my best recollection is as

follows.
a.

After the recess, Judge Brady advised us that a juror asked to read

the toxicology report. I requested that exhibits 2 and 3 be published to the jury for them
to review. I then announced to the court that the State would rest.

As to the missing portions of Mr. Martinez-Castellanos's direct

b.

examination, my best recollection is that he testified to the following:
1.

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was driving from California to Salt

Lake City for his brother's graduation. He had been on the road for 12-13 hours.
11.

He had worked in a warehouse for 9 or 10 hours before

traveling to Utah.
iii.

He did not pack much.

1v.

He drove an Acura that he had purchased possibly from an

auction or from a used car dealer a month earlier. It was trashy inside. He did not clean it.
Nevertheless, he was taking it to his brother as a graduation present.
v.

The registration showed that the car had been registered three

months earlier.

"
(.~•.
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vi.

With the exception of items used for marijuana, including a

grinder and lighter which Mr. Martinez-Castellanos admitted belonged to him, he denied
knowing anything about drugs or drug items in the car.
vii.

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos has problems with his back. He saw

a doctor and had a prescription for Percocet but did not like it. He was under doctor's
orders to use medical marijuana.
viii.

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos described how on June 9, 2010, he

.

was northbound on the interstate. A patrol car was traveling in the opposite direction with
emergency lights on, and as the cars reached the same point, the officer made a U-tum.
The officer quickly approached Mr. Martinez-Castellanos from behind with his
emergency lights on. The officer continued northbound driving beside Mr. MartinezCastellanos' scar. He then turned off his overhead lights, turned them on again and pulled
behind Mr. Martinez-Castellanos for the stop.
1x.

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos kept the car registration in the

glove box.

10.

I have attached my notes for jury selection and for Mr. Martinez-

Castellanos' s direct examination.
Executed on this

\7

day of February, 2014.

~~lG ---------Jared W. ~ldri'dge
Juab Coun'ty Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the J1_ day of February, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Declaration of Jared W. Eldridge to be served on the following via first-

,

class mail, postage prepaid:
Laura B. Dupaix
Office of the Utah Attorney General
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

,

9

Defendant
Notebook:
Created:
Location:

•

cases
11/1/2012 1:35 PM

Uodated:

11/1/2012 2:15 PM

Juab Countv. Utah. United States

Goina to SLC
Brother araduated
Travelina from CA
TRAVELING 12-13 hrs
Workina in a warehouse
Worked 9-10 hrs before left to utah
Didn't oack much
Drove Acura
Had car 1 mo. (Reaistration shows 3 mos)
Purchased vehide from used car dealer
Trashv inside
Did not clean the car
Not aware of druas in car
Troooer came uo behind him quick, pulled beside him turned off lights
Had iust reaistered
Keot reaistration in alove box
Cleaned alove box & center console
Has had oroblems w / back
Had Percocet didn't like
Back oroblems
Saw a Dr.
Beaan usina mariiuana as a result of Dr.
Person traded in 2 days before he purchasedwasnot using meth or hydrocodone

.

Redirect
Would put knives in console for work

.
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•
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

i1
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JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

•

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 101600146 FS

Plaintiff,

Appellate Court Case No. 20130432

V

•

ABISAI MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS, :
Defendant.

•

: With Keyword Index

SUPPRESSION HEARING OCTOBER 28, 2010
BEFORE

I

THE HONORABLE JAMES BRADY

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186
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APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

ANNMARIE T. HOWARD
Juab County Attorney

For the Defendant:

MILTON T. HARMON
Attorney at Law

***

INDEX
Page
WITNESS
JOHN SHEETS
Direct Examination by Mr. Eldridge
Cross Examination by Mr. Harmon

2
23

RULING, ORDER

34

•

•

•
-------

•

1

NEPHI , UTAH - OCTOBER 28, 2010

2

JUDGE JAMES BRADY

3

•
•

•

•
•

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT: We have a 1:30 suppression hearing .

7

Harmon and the defendant - it's State of Utah vs . Abisai

8

Martinez-Castellanos.

9

witness here now?

Mr.

And Ms. Howard, you do have your

Is that correct?

10

MS . HOWARD: Yes, Your Honor .

11

THE COURT: Let's go ahead and proceed with the
suppression hearing .
MS. HOWARD: We call Trooper Sheets.

13

14

JOHN SHEETS

15

Having first been duly sworn, testified

16

upon his oath as follows:

17

THE COURT: Could you hold on for just one second,

18

•

(Transcriber's note: speaker identification

4

12

•

-- -- - - - - -- - - - - ,

Ms. Howard?

19

MS. HOWARD: Yes.

20

THE COURT: I wanted to make certain.

I don't

21

believe I heard the preliminary hearing, but I do recall that

22

I had Mr. Martinez in my courtroom recently.

23

remember - oh, we were just at a pretrial conference.

24

fine.

25

Ill

I was trying to
That's

Thank you .

1

•

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · · ··- - - - - - ~

•
1

2

DIRECT EXAMINATION

•

BY MS. HOWARD:

3

Q

Would you please state your name?

4

A

Trooper John Sheets.

5

Q

And what is your occupation?

6

A

A trooper at the Utah Highway Patrol.

7

Q

Were you working within Juab County on or about

8

•

9

A

I was.

10

Q

On that date did you come in contact with the

11

•

June 9 th , 2010?

defendant?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And you recognize him here today?

14

A

Yes, sitting at the table with a gray and black

15

shirt.

16

Q

Okay, thank you.

•

Would you please state for the

17

court your training and experience with drug interdiction and

18

detection?

19

A

•

I've been on the Utah Highway Patrol drug and

20

interdiction squad since 2001.

I've been an officer for

21

about 20 years in various capacities.

22

numerous training classes associated with the interdiction

23

squad - Deseret Snow, many classes put on by the state as

24

well as the federal DLT. And then Rocky Mountain High,

25

been through several classes with them.

I've been through

I've

2

-·--··-···-·-·······------··---··----- ·· ·--··---··-·- · · -

-

•

--- --~-"'--·------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

•

•
•

•

------1
2

•

•
•
•
•

•

Okay.

A

2001.

4

Q

2001?

5

7

-·

-----•-··-----·------·

And you've been on the drug interdiction

team for how long did you say?

3

6

•

Q

.......,.

As part of the drug interdiction squad or

team, do you familiarize yourself with adjacent state's laws?
A

Yes.

Not just interdiction, but just regular

patrol.

8

Q

Okay.

9

A

You know, we - working the Highway Patrol, you deal

10

with a lot of people from out-of-state coming through.

11

you have to be familiar with, like Window 10, and

12

registration, and what they're required, and so we can

13

enforce the laws.

So

14

Q

Front plate -

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

- requirements and things of that nature?

17

A

That's correct.

18

Q

Does that include experience with the California -

19

A

Yes.

20

state.

21

as well as Arizona and Nevada.

22

Q

California is one of our major - it's a close

So a lot of people coming through are from California

Okay.

All right.

On this date in question, would

23

yo u state for the court how it is you came in contact with

24

the defendant?

25

A

I observed a gold Acura traveling northbound and
3

•

·· - ·- - - - - -~

1

when it passed me, it appeared to only have one sticker on

2

it.

3

stickers - one month, one year on each side, and they're

4

fairly - you know, they're good.

5

can see them.

California plates are fairly legible.

So you

Q

Yeah.

7

A

- so you can - but this one only had one, and I'm

8

familiar with California.

9

year.

11

•

I wish all the states were like that -

6

10

•

They have two

They're visible.

•

They require two, the month and a

So I pu l led out and stopped it .

Q

Okay.

•

Did you take - after the fact, did you take

a picture of the vehicle?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

A front picture as well as a rear picture of the -

14

A

That's correct -

15

Q

- of the vehicle?

16

A

- as well as the plates so you could see that there

17

Okay.

19

state?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Is that correct?

22

A

Yes.

25

•

And you provided a copy of that to the

Q

24

•

was no - the missing sticker wasn't there.

18

23

•

•

MS. HOWARD: Your Honor, may I approach with
Plaintiff's Exhibit l?
THE COURT: Yes.
4

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---· -·····

•

•
•

----------

1
2
3

•

4
5
6

•

•

7

•

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 and ask you if you can identify this.
A

Q

•
•

Okay .

This first picture - can you state what that

is - the one that's in the upper left hand corner?
A

Okay.

This is the license plate I took, and this

is the plate that was on the car - the California plate.

9

can see it's only got the year sticker on there and the -

You

10

where the month's suppose to be, you can see it either fell

11

off, or was taken off, or . . .

13

Q

Okay .

And you have - did you alter or change these

pictures in any way?

14

A

No.

15

Q

Do they accurately reflect the scene as you saw it

16
17

19

Those are the pictures I took on the scene.

that day?
A

Yes.
MS. HOWARD: May I approach, Your Honor, with this

Exhibit 1?
THE COURT: Has it been shown to the defense

20
21

•

These are the pictures I took of the car, and then

of the driver so I can remember him in court .

18

•

(BY MS. HOWARD) I have what's been marked as

8

12

•

Q

counsel?

22

MS. HOWARD: Yes, it has, Your Honor.

23

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

24

MS. HOWARD: I'd like to offer.

25

THE COURT: Any objections?
5

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------··

·--···--·--····

----···

-- -

.....

----------------------

- -

-·•--·--·~ -- · · - - -,

1

MR. HARMON: Not for this hearing, Your Honor.

2

THE COURT: Thank you.

hearing, the exhibit - Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 will be

4

received.

5

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 received)

6

MS. HOWARD: Okay, thank you.

7

8

Q

•

For purposes of this

3

•

(BY MS. HOWARD) So you pursued and stopped this

vehicle for that violation?

•

•

Is that -

9

A

That's correct.

10

Q

Okay.

11

A

I approached the vehicle and advised the driver why

What happened next?

12

I was stopping him. He was missing his month sticker.

13

appeared to be a little bit, you know, surprised that it

14

wasn't on there.

15

expired Colorado driver's license, and then I looked at the

16

registration and observed that the registration - the year

17

sticker should have been 2011, cause it expired in March of

18

2011.

19

plate.

20

Q

So the plate was expired as well; is that correct?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Okay.

23

A

Well, according to the registration, it was

•

He

e

He provided me the registration and an

•

So he didn't even have the proper year sticker on the

•

•

And -

24

properly registered, but the sticker is - the proper stickers

25

weren't put on it yet.
6

•

-----·-···- · · · - - - - - - - -

'

•
•

---1

•

•

then.

3

was showing an improper registration?

•

What you saw on the plate showed that the plate itself

A

Yes.

It only had the 2010 .

Is that correct?
It didn ' t have the

5

month.

6

it should have been - had a February - or a March there -

7

sticker there.

8

sticker on there - according to what was on the plate, i t

9

would have been shown to be expired.

So I didn't know what month it expired in 2010,

Q

Expired plates; is that correct?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

Okay.

And so you discover that he has an expired

13

Cali - Colorado driver's license as well as expired

14

registration stickers on the plate; is that correct?

16

A

Yes.

and

So according to the - if it hadn't this month

10

15

•

So what you saw - and I should rephrase that

2

4

•

Okay.

Q

----

The 2011

A 2010 sticker was on there.

sticker wasn't placed on there yet .

17

Q

Okay.

What happened at that point?

18

A

He said he had a valid Utah license.

He just

19

didn't have it with him, and then we discussed the, and then

20

I told him the month sticker - or the year sticker wasn't on

21

there.

22

So he - we had a conversation about that, and I believe that

23

he stated it fe l l o f f or somebody took it.

24

exactly.

25

Q

And then the month sticker wasn't on there either.

Okay.

I wasn't sure

So up to that point, what violations of law
7

•

--·--·------- -- - - - - - -

•

- - ---· - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1

did you · see?

•

2

A

The improper display.

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

Plus he gave me an expired driver's l i cense.

5

Q

Okay.

6

While you were talking to him then, did you

notice anything about him that was suspicious to you?
A

7

Yes.

He was a little bit jittery.

He had jittery

8

speech and fast speech, and it made me a little bit concerned

9

that he might have been on some type of stimulant.

•

10

Q

A stimulant?

11

A

Yes, based on what I saw.

12

Q

What did you do at that point?

13

A

Went back to my car, ran checks, and determined

14

that he did have a valid Utah license, and then that the

15

registration was actually suppose to be 3-2011.

16

didn't have the stickers on there like he was suppose to

17

have.

18

was suppose to have.

19

history check on him like - while we were running checks on

20

him.

21
22
23

•

He just

He didn't have his drivers license with him like he

Q

So - and then I also ran a criminal

And what did you discover for purposes of this

hearing today?
A

e

He had a criminal history including drug offenses,

24

which heightened my suspicions that he might be on the

25

influence of something based on what I saw and in his
8

•

~ - - -- --------·"·--

•

~

•

l

•

•
•

•

•

jittery movements.
Yes .

5

Q

Was that more or less than what you'd expect based

upon nervousness of a driver?
A

7

Well, this wasn't nervousness.

8

there's a difference.

9

really fast,

It was just -

When you're jittery and you're talking

it - based on my training and my experience as a

10

police officer and dealing with thousands of cars that I've

11

stopped in my career, this made me more like it was - he was

12

under the influence of something.

13
14

Q

Okay.

Then what course of action did you take

A

I went back to the car and had him step out.

next?

I

16

advised him that I was going to have him do field sobriety

17

tests, cause he was what I called - told him he was bouncing

18

around a little bit.

19

Q

And what test did you have him perform?

20

A

Well, first of all,

I asked him if he had any

21

weapons for my safety, and he said that there's some knives

22

in the car.

23

Q

24

•

You said that he had rapid speech and rapid and

A

15

•

Q

4

6

•

-·---

criminal history.

2
3

---·-•····-·

25

Okay.

And did you retrieve those at that point,

or

did you A

Yes.

And the - I advised him - I had determined
9

- - - - - - - -- 1

that he was a convicted felon.

2

he had weapons in the ~ar, that kind of raised my suspicions

3

of whether he's - he was going to be restricted or not.

4

Determine what size of the knife it was.

5

teeny one, or a kitchen knife, or something.

6
7

Q

Okay.

So the weapon - when he said

If it was a little

And this was after you checked the criminal

•

history; is that correct?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Okay.

10

felon?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And then you asked him out of the vehicle?

13

A

Yes, to do some field sobriety tests.

14

Q

And that's when he told that he had weapons in the

15

And you had determined he was a convicted

•

vehicle?

16

A

He had knives in the car in the center console.

17

Q

And did you retrieve them at that point?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

Did you look any further in the vehicle, or did you

20
21

•

•

,.

just retrieve the knives?
A

Well, I found the knives, and then I believe -

22

have to read the report here.

23

kn i ves .

Okay.

24

Q

And what sizes were they?

25

A

Just medium-sized knives.

I'll

•

Yeah, I retrieved the

They weren't the little

10
- - - - - - - - - - - - .... ---·---------- ---

•

-·-----·---

I

•
•

1

tiny ones that you'd put in your pocket.

2

bit - the bigger ones.
Q

3

•

•
•
•

4

•
•

•

A

Well, the knives were in the center console where

6

he said they were, and then there was some - like a marijuana

7

grinder in there shaped like a hand grenade.

8

had him do the field sobriety test to begin with.

So I believe I

9

Q

The field sobriety tests were first?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

Well, I found the knives first, and then I had him

13

do some field sobriety tests.

14

here.

16
17
18

•

But you didn't search the vehicle any further at

that point; is that correct?

5

15

•

They were a little

Q

Okay.

I've got to read my report

We'll give you just a second to refresh your

recollection.
A

Yeah.

I did the reports - or did the field

sobriety tests on the scene.

19

Q

Field sobriety tests on the scene?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Before or after the knives were found?

22

A

Before - or after.

23

Q

After the field sobriety tests?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Okay.

Excuse me.

So just so that this is clear, you checked

11

•
1

his criminal history, you'd noted the traffic violations, and

2

then you went back and had him perform field sobriety tests;

3

is that correct?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And at that point, there were no searches of the

6
7

vehicle?
A

•

You were still investigating?
I didn't do the inventory yet.

I believe I took

8

the knife out first - and found the knife first, and then had

9

him do field sobriety tests, and then I went back to do the

•

10

big search.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

But when I pulled the knife out, I saw the

13
14
15

Okay.

But you didn't seize it at that point; is

that correct?

16

A

No.

17

Q

Okay.

18

They stayed in the car, I believe.
What - after you - he told you there was a

knife, and so you retrieved that; is that correct?

19

A

Uh-huh (affirmative), yes.

20

Q

After you retrieved it, then did you have him

21

•

marijuana grinder, cause it was in the same pot.
Q

perform the field sobriety tests?

•

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

The first test I gave him was the eye gaze, and he

25

•

Wh ich test did you have him perform?

had lack of convergence in both eyes.
12

•

----- -- ------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - '

•

•
- - - -·-----•-··

•
•

•
•

Q

Okay.

2

A

And then I gave him the Rhornberg.

3

Q

And what did you note on the Rhornberg?

4

A

One inch front to back sway, and he estimated 30

5

•
•
•

seconds in 36 seconds, and he had the eyelid tremors.
Q

I don't believe in this hearing that we've covered

7

your training, Officer, as a drug recognition expert.

8

could state that for the record?

If you

9

A

I'm a DRE as well as a DRE instructor.

10

Q

Okay.

11

A

Since 2004.

12

Q

2004?

13

A

2006.

14

Q

And your currently still certified for both; is

15

•

-----

1

6

•

~-

16
17

And you've been a DRE for how many years?

And an instructor for how many years?

that correct?
A

Yes .

I just sent off my stuff this year - this

week - or this - to get re-certified.

So -

18

Q

Okay.

19

A

- all this stuff's coming in.

20

Q

The Rhomberg is a DRE test; is that correct?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Okay.

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Of how far?

25

A

One inch.

And you said that you noticed a sway?

13
---------------------- - - - -- -- - -- - - - -- - -- - -- - -- - - -- ---'

•

•
1

Q

Okay.

2

A

And then he had the eyelid tremors.

3

Q

Are those also a DRE test?

4

A

Yeah, there's a clue on the Rhomberg.

5

Q

Sure, okay.

6

A

Plus an indication of drug use.

And what happens next?

And then the walk

7

and turn, his number three steps he had his arms up and

8

stopped before the turn in a military turn.

9

Q

And what was the next test?

J0

A

The one-leg stand.

He had a swaying balance,

11

he counted to 23 in 30 seconds,

12

It was 108, which is high.

and then I took his pulse.

Sixty and 90 is normal.

13

Q

And did you check his eyes?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And what did you notice about those?

16

A

He had the red eyed conjunctiva.

17

Q

Based upon your training and experience, wha t

18

and

•

is

t h at indicative of?
A

The main thing it's the marijuana use.

.-,. ()

Q

Okay.

21

,IJ.,

Wel l , those are the fou r

Q

Okay.

Any other test tj a t

•

you had h im perform?

I did .

Bas ed upon the evidence yo u found at the

;:. 3

scer:e - hi s - vo;_i r con ve .csat.::.o,: wit h him a::id an y thi ng that

2 -4

was - you saw on the field sobriety tests,

25

opinion as to whether or not he was driv ing under the

did you form a~

.
14

- - - ·~~--· -·- -

....,_. · -····--

. .. _..

-··- ···---·---- ...

----- -- - -·-··" ·-·-·--- ..- --- ·- --

.

•

•

--------~

influence of a drug or that he was under - driving with a

2

rnetabola o f a drug in his system?

4
5
6

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

-·----·---

1

3

•

. --

A

Yes.

So he was placed under arrest for that and

the weapons violation.
Q

Okay .

What happened - so at that point, he was

arrested?

7

A

Yes .

8

Q

On the scene?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And was his rights read to him there?

11

A

No.

12

Q

And you didn't interview him any further there?

13

A

No .

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

I went back to search the car.

16

Q

Was that pursu - what was that pursuant to?

17

A

I did an inventory.

What did you do after he was arrested?

It could have been a

18

contraband search, cause there was a knife.

And then when I

19

was getting the knife out - check - or checking the knife, he

20

said he had - I saw the marijuana or grinder in the console

21

with the knives.

22

Q

Okay.

Did you use an inventory form?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Okay.

25

A

Well, the state tax form, which is also an
15

•

•
1

inventory form.

2
3

Q

A~d that - is that - was that following procedure

for an inventory?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And it's completed there?

6

A

Yes.

7

MS. HOWARD:

Does the Court wish to see that?

8

THE COURT: Yes.

9

MS. HOWARD: May I approach?

10

THE COURT: Yes.

11

MS. HOWARD: May I app~oach with Plaintiff's Exhibit

12

2?
THE COURT: Yes.

l3
14

Q

(BY MS. HOWARD)

I have what's been marked

Plaintiff's Exh ibit 2 and ask you if you can identify this?
This is a copy of the inven - or the - here's the

16
17

original here o n front,

and this is a copy of the inven -

18

state tax/inventory form.

) 9

Q

And where was this filled out at?

20

A

At t he scene.

21

Q

Okay.

the

An d s o ail of the writ:ing on here is from

wh a'.: ,,as done at the scene; is that c o rre c t?
A

Not~i n g fu rther wa s a d ded once y o u -

24

25

Yeah .

A

I don't believe so.

16

•
-·-··-

•

--·---------

1

Q

- [inaudible]?

2

A

Yeah .

3

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•

4

Okay .

MS. HOWARD : I'd like to offer Plaintiff's Exhibit
2.

5

THE COURT: Any objections, Mr. Harmon?

6

MR . HARMON : Not for this hearing.

7

THE COURT: Thank you .

8

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 received)

9

MS . HOWARD: Thank you, Your Honor .

10

Q

It ' ll be received .

(BY MS . HOWARD) On that fo r m then that you have

11

also in front of you as well as the Court - as you inventory

12

the vehicl e , what did you do with that form?

13

A

Well, I take it up to the car.

And as I find

14

stuff, I write the belongings on the first line, and then I

15

write the damage that's on the second line.

16

17

Q

Okay.

So you're noting the exterior of the

vehicle?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

And then what happened?

20

A

And while I'm doing this, I'm looking for the con -

21

taking whatever contraband.

22

the marijuana grinder.

23

too.

Based on finding marijuana - or

So I'm also looking for contraband

24

Q

Okay.

25

A

And the knife, of course.
17

•
1

Q

And so what did you find in that vehicle?

2

A

Well, in that same console, there was I believe the

3

two knives that he said he had, and then there was the

4

marijuana grinder.

5

and then there was a little - another little hand grenade

6

looking thing.

I had to ask him what it was, and he said it

7

was a lighter.

So there's the marijuana grinder shaped like

8

a hand grenade.

9

the center console, and then I found some other things.

10

. Q

11

A

It was shaped like a little hand grenade,

•
•

The lighter is shaped like a hand grenade in

•

And what were those things?
There was a bindle containing a white, crystal like

12

substance under the center console.

13

center con - sticking out kind of on the center console on

14

the driver's side seat, and the substance tested positive for

15

meth.

16

cigarette paper - or cigarette box cellophane, and it

17

contained three oblong, white pills, and it was also under

18

the console with - next to the other substance, and these

19

were identified as Hydrocodone.

It was between the

•

And there was also a cellophane like you wrap the

20

Q

Okay.

21

A

And the two - like I said, the two knives were

•

22

located in the center console, and there was a cellophane

23

wrapper with seven pills under the left front driver's seat,

24

and these were just not prescription, non-scheduled anti-

25

seizure medication.

•

•

18
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1

Q

Okay.

2

A

And a glass pipe with a burnt residue was under the

3

.left - up underneath the driver's seat, and a black case with

4

a pipe was located in the glove box, and three twists with a

5

residue were located on the right front floorboard.

6

•
•

7

•
•
•

•

So all of these things that were found, Officer,

were found in the passenger compartment of the vehicle?

8

A

That's correct.

9

Q

Okay.

10

A

Nothing was located in the trunk.

11

12

•

Q

No contraband

was located in the trunk.
Q

All right.

After you did your inventory of the

13

vehicle, did you sign your form indicating that you had

14

completed it?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

And did you send that into the state?

17

A

It was given a copy to the record driver.

18

Q

Okay.

19

A

And then we sent - have a copy of it .

20

Q

Okay.

21

A

And then he gets a copy of it too.

22

Q

Okay.

23

A

The defendant -

24

Q

- defendant?

25

A

- yes.

What happened when -

The - he meaning the -

19

•

-

-·- .......................·--·-·--- - - -----'

•

- - - - - -...............---- -

1

2

Q

Okay.

And you complied with those requirements and

distributed those copies?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

The tow came and took the car, and he was - the

What happened next then?

6

defendant was transported to jail.

7

admonitions, and he refused to take - I asked him to take a

8

urine test, and he refused to take a urine test.

9

Q

admonition?

11

A

It's on the DUI form.

12

Q

Where were you located?

13

A

Oh.

14

Q

Okay.

I read him the

••

17

Q

- to read it to him?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

So if it's marked that you told him he was under

11

the arrest - under arrest, was that done there at the jail?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Okay.

A

He said, Yes, sir.

25

•

it in as you proceeded Yes.

24

•

As you went through the form, did you fill

A

23

•

We were at the jail.

16

20

•

Where is it that you read him the chemical test

10

15

•

And the next - what was his response to

I

that?
Know - understanding that he

was under arrest for that.

11
20

•
--~ ----~-- - - - · - - - - - - - - - - - -

•

1
2

3

•

4
5
6

•
•

•
•
•
•

•

Q

Okay.

And then you told him that - oh, what did

you tell him next?
A

Then I read him - I'd like him to submit to a urine

and blood test, and then I read him the first admonition.
Q

Okay.

And what was his statement to you during

that reading - after that reading of the admonition?

I smoke marijuana."

7

A

~I'm going to hold off.

8

Q

Then did you read him the refusal admonition?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And once again, what is the time marked to the side

11

of the second -

12

A

Twelve - 12:38 in the afternoon.

13

Q

For the refusal admonition?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Prior to that, it's 12:36 for the first admonition?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Okay.

18

admonition?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

And what was his response to that?

21

A

"I'm denying it.

22

Q

So what did you do then at that point?

23

A

And I also read him the counsel admonition.

24

Q

At the same time?

25

A

About a minute later.

And you read to him the entire refusal

My rights are being violated.n

21

•

-
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•
1

Q

A rrinute later?

You read to him - that admonition

is recorded at 12:39?

2
3

A

Yes.

4

Q

And what is that one?

5

A

That's the right to counsel.

Just to inform him of

6

- he doesn't have the right to refuse and - or the right to

7

counsel and all that stuff.

8

Q

9

there?

10

A

Could you read that for the record?

What it says

"Your right to remain silent, and your right to

J.1

counsel do not apply - do not apply to imply consent law

12

which is civil in nature and separate from the criminal

13

charges.

1-1

right to refuse to take the test.

Your right to remain silent does not give you the
You do not have the right

C:

.L

.J

to counsel during ates~ procedure.

7

6

test,

~

7

~ef use d to take the test.

1

Unless you submit to the

I'm re questing and I wj_J] consider that you have

I warn you that if you refuse to

your drivi~g privilege can be revoked with no

18

take the test,

19

provisions for limited driving.n

20

Q

Okay.

What did you do then a t

21

A

I 2:"ead him that,
So I

tjat point?

and he still didn't want to do it

obtained -

advised him I

22

- g i ve the test.

23

to co cet a - o btain a war rant, a nd I did.
Okay.

Q

I

was going

And you filled in a search warrant; is that

correct?

25

22
-
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~

-
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-
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•

•
•
•
•

1

A

Yes .

2

Q

And that warrant was heard by which judge?

3

A

Judge Eyre.

4

Q

And what was the result of you applying for that

5
6

A

He signed it and gave it to me.

7

Q

Okay.

8

A

I went back to the jail.

9

•

warrant?

I

•

then I believe Trooper Housekeeper came and conducted a blood

11

draw.

13

MS. HOWARD:

If I may have just a minute,

Your

Honor?

14

THE COURT: You may.

15

MS. HOWARD: That's all I have for this hearing,

16

Your Honor.

17

THE COURT: Thank you.

18

Mr. Harmon, do you have questions?

19

MR. HARMON: Yes.

21

t

and

10

20

I

I advised him I had a

warrant and gave him the thing he - the copy he needed,

12

•

And then what happens next?

22

We have some, Your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. HARMON:
Q

Officer, after you stopped the defendant, did you

23

ever take him back to the back of his vehicle to show him the

24

license plate and the condition of the stickers?

25

A

He was back there, yes, cause that's where we did

23

•
1
2

3

4
5

the field sobriety tests.

they were missing?
To tell you the truth,

A

I can't believe - I can't

remember if I did or not, but he was back there.

6

Q

Okay.

7

A

And we were back there.

8

Q

But when you initially told him that the stickers

9

10

•

And did he - did you show him the stickers where

Q

were missing,
Yes.

A

first I

that was a puzz~e to him, wasn't it?
He said it must have fallen off or ...

told him about the month sticker,

Well,

cause I didn't run

the plate.

13

don't k~ow if it was expired or not.

14

about the month sticke r .

15

regi stration and 1 showed - and it showed that it should have

16

been 2011,

17

18
19
20
21

Q

So we were just talking

And then when he handed me the

I advised h im - yeah,

•

you're missing both of them.

You were able to co~firm t hro ug h the records that

h e did - that the vehicle was validly registered to him?
A

Yes.

It exp~red on three of 2011, but h e just had

•

the 2010 s ticke r on the plate.
Q

Okay.

And who did the vehicle belong to?

Mr. Martinez-Castellanos.

22
23

So I didn't know - or see the registration.

So I

12

Q

Okay.

•

And so you were able to confirm that h e

wo ul d have been confused ass~ning that he had it properly
25

registe.::-ed?

•
24

'

•
-

•

1
2

3

4
5
6

•

7

•

•

And you also were able to confirm that he did have

Q

a valid driver's license?
Yes.

A

He didn't have it with him, but he had a

valid one.
Q

Okay.

You indicated that you searched in the

for conducting that search?
A

the car.
Q

Okay.

13

A

No, not at that point.

And did you ask him to get them for you?
He's a convicted felon,

14

I don't want him grabbing knives on me.

15

safety thing.

17

19

Q

and

That's an officer

Did your record check show what he was convicted -

the charge he was convicted of?
A

Yes.

But offhand, I couldn't tell you.

I know he

had several drug charges.
None related to violence?

20

Q

Okay.

21

A

I don't recall what they were .

22

Q

Okay.

23

A

I got both of them,

24

Q

Okay.

25

What was the reason

He is a convicted felon and said he had knives in

12

16

It was

properly registered, yes.

9

18

•

I don't know if he was confused or not.

vehicle and searched the center console.

11

•

·--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

8

10

•

A

--

Did you seize the weapon - the knife?
yes.

And you say that they were medium-sized.

About how long would the blade be on the knife?
25

•

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -·---·· --··-

..

•

---- -- - - - - - - - - - -

1

A

Between two and four inches.

2

Q

Between two and four?

3

A

Yes.

•

They were - like I said, they weren't the

4

small - the really small ones, and they weren't the big ones.

5

So they - I would say that they were the medium-sized ones.

6

Q

Would they be like a pocket knife that a carpenter

•

7

would carry?

8

A

I don't know.

9

Q

Or that a handy person would carry around -

10

A

They're just

11

Q

- the house?

12

A

- typical knives people carry around with them.

13

Q

Okay.

•

THE COURT: Mr. Harmon,

14

let me ask you a question

15

that hasn't been - it may have been stated.

16

clear on it.

17

are we talking about a fixed blade knife?

Are we talking about a f6lding type knife,

18

THE WITNESS: It's a folding one.

19

THE COURT: Okay.

inches, you're referring to the -

21

THE WITNESS: The blade.

22

THE COURT: Thank you.
(BY MR. HARMON) Okay.

Q

24

appearance,

25

A

·•

or

•

And when you say two to three

20

23

I'm just not

Okay.
And these weren't unusual in

I take it?

No.

They were just the kind you buy and people
26

·------------- --- - - - - - -

•
•

1
2
3

•
•
•

Something like that?

Q

Okay.

6

knives for?

7

A

Just about anything that you cut with -

8

Q

Okay.

9

A

- and do handiwork with, whatever.

10

Q

So it may be a utility tool, rather than a

11

13
14

16

19
20

And what do people usually use those type of

dangerous weapon?
A

Well, they're a dangerous weapon.

If you got

stabbed with one of those, they could do damage.
Q

But that would be - the same would be true of a

mini screwdrivers and things like that?
A

Well, yeah.

And these are knives.

So they're a

little bit different than a screwdriver.
Q

Was there ever any indication that the defendant

intended to use them for any criminal purpose?
A

21

console.

22

with them.

23

t

the boy's growing up?

5

18

•

And like a father would give to his son as

Anybody carries them.

17

•

Okay.

A

15

•

Q

4

12

•

carry around.

Q

They were in the glove box.

I don't - or in the

So I don't know what his ultimate intention were

Okay.

Would these be t he type of knife that a

24

person would be advised to carry apart of - as part of his

25

emergency equipment in his vehicle?
27
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'

•
I don't know.

l

A

2

stuff with.

3

Q

4

You can use them,

you know,

to cut

And you may use those as a part of your emergency

equipment?

s

A

You can, yes.

6

Q

Okay.

You - was the basis for doing the field

7

sobriety tests what you felt was his jittery and his jittery

8

movements?

9

}0
11
12

A

Yes.

When I

first walked up to the car,

And then when I ran him,
Q

Okay .

before?
Not that I remeIT~er.

14

Q

Did you know anything at all about him?

15

A

Not - well,

I

-

only what I

•

found out on my

investiga t ion when I ran him.

C

Okay.

Was there any of that that would indicate

18

that you should do the field sobriety tests when you did your

19

background check on him?

20
21

A

'.! 'hat \vasn ' t the r-easo:-'

i: did it.

And tel1 us again w:iat the reason for doing ].

?,..,

,~

•

Well, he had drug charges, but that just added to

my suspicions.

t,L

,·'

•

You - had you ever seen the defendant

A

~7

saw it.

that kind of added to my suspicions.

13

16

I

.A

Hi s

jit ter y mov ements,

appeared that he was,

his rapid speech,

+-

~

was.

and it

like I said, he was on - what I thought

•

he could have been under s t imulants.
28

"

1

Q

Okay.

2

A

Cause based on all the people I 2.rrest for

3

stim~lants and dealt with,

4

Q

Now,

he was - it made me thi~~ so.

you did the blood draw and had that examined;

is that right?

5

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

And did that show that he was negative for illicit

drugs in his system?

8
9

A

10

Q

12

14

:s
16

He was oositive for something.

I don't have

it with me, but I don't recall what it was.

11

13

No.

Okay.

Did he prod~ce ~or you a prescription from a

physician in California showing that he had medical
1

mariju2.na?
A

He said he had a medical marijuana card, but

they're not valid in Utah .
Q

Okay.

Tell me what your policy is now as you -

as

17

a law enforcement officer as you've discussed this question

18

of medical marijuana and people driving on the freeway from

1

0.

20
?l

California?
A

It's not va!id i ::1 Utah.

So we're - we treat them

j~st like everybody else that possesses an i llegal controlled
substa::ice.

'

o:-<:a y.
24

Did y,_,,_: :, av e a:-:y c cm ve r~;a.t:i on

·✓1ith

him abo·.1t

~he fac~ that h3ving a prescript~on for ~a~ijuana in
Califor~ia doesn't al ~ow t1im to ~ rj_~g i t in c o Utah?

29

•
]_

A

I believe= told him that that's not valid in Utah.

2

Q

Okay.

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

Even though he may have legally obtained it in

3

And that still leads to a criminal charge

the~,?

6

California and have a legitimate, physical reason for the

7

marijuana?

8

A

That 's correct.

9

Q

Was the defendant cooperative with you?

10

A

Up until I requested him to do the urine test,

11

12
13
14
1.5

and

then I had to get a warrant.
Q

Okay.

And the only thing he asked for was that you

do tha~ with a warrant?
A

Oh, he didn't say do a warrant.

saying - he kept saying his rights were being violated.

16

Q

Okay .

17

A

I

18

Q

And you read the admonitions from the form?

19

A

Yes.

I read all three of them.

20

Q

Okay,

and yo~ indica~ed that he did have a valid

21
22

•

He just refused

•

told him I

driver's license.
A.

was going to get a warrant.

Which state issued that?

Utah.
W~ e n yo~ oh~~inerl ~he sea ~ch warrant from Judqe

24

Eyre, did you complete an affidavit to support the issuance

25

of the warrant?
30

•
•

1

A

I did.

2

Q

Was there ever a copy of that and the warrant left

3

•
•

with the defendant?
Yes.

6

Q

Where was he when you gave that to him?

7

A

The jail.

8

room there.

5

have.

•
•
•

10

Q

(BY MR. HARMON) Officer, could I just go back over

11

one thing with you?

12

saw his vehicle?

Where was the defendant when you first

13

A

Driving down the road.

14

Q

And what direction was he -

15

A

Northbound.

16

Q

And where were you?

17

A

I believe I was sitting on the side of the road.

18

Q

And which side?

19

A

The right side on the shoulder, cause I had just

20

'

Actually, we were sitting in the little

(Inaudible conversation with client)

9

•

I gave him the copy that he was suppose to

A

4

stopped another car and finished up with them.

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

No.

2.3

Q

So - and were you stationary when the defendant

24

passed you?

25

A

Yes.

Were you southbound at that time?
I was northbound.

I was - like I said, I was sitting on the
31
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1

shoulder.

2

Q

I believe I had just finished a stop.
Okay.

And why was it that you stopped the

defendant?

3

4

A

Why?

5

Q

Yes.

6

A

When he came by, like I said, California plates are

7

really visible.

8

st i cker wasn't there.

I could see that the

So when he come by,

9

Q

And that's why you were working on the other side?

10

A

Well,

11

I had already completed that.

I was just

sitting there.

12

Q

Okay.

13

A

l

believe I was getting ready to come back out on

•

t h e road.

14
15

Q

Okay.

Did the fact that the car was licensed in

California have anything to do with you stopping it?

16
17

A

No.

I stop cars from a:1 the states.

So it

doesn ' t matter.

18
19

Q

How about the fact that the defendant was Hispanic?

20

A

No.

That doesn't ha ve a n ything to do with it.

21

lo ok for vio la tion s .

22

wh en t he y come b y.

?l

I

I don't l ook for what race people are
11

p·r,FJ:1rl ih ·1 e con v ersation with client)

24

Q

(BY VR. HARMON) Was t here a kind of recording made

of this stop - an aud i o or a visua l

25

I

II .

I

32

•
•

•

1

A

I believe so.

2

Q

Okay.

3

A

It would be in the locker with all the other ones

4
5
6

•

7

•

•
•
•
I

if it's there.
Q

Has that been provided for the county attorneys

office?
A

8
9

Do you know where that is now?

Not yet .
MR. HARMON: I think that's all the questions we

have, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Harmon.

11

Anything further?

12

MS. HOWARD: Nothing further .

13

THE COURT: Ms. Howard?

14

MS. HOWARD: The State rests.

15

THE COURT: Thank you.

16

You may step down.

Is there

any other evidence we're going to be seeking today?

17

MR. HARMON: The defendant will submit, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Thank you.

19

MR. HARMON: We do have some requests, however,

Does -

20

though.

21

and we'd like to get a copy of that.

22

We - there is the recording that was made of this,

THE COURT: I was just going to address a couple of

23

questions that came to my mind.

24

motions, we have an evidentiary hearing, and then the

25

parties, based on the evidence, sometimes like to submit a

Many times in these types of

33
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•
1

brief.

2

of evidence, but there may be additional evidence that may be

3

requested,

4

me to simply make rulings based on what I've heard,

5

intended to brief ~his before I make a decision.

In this case,

it sounds like you have certain amo~nts

if it's available.

I was wondering if you wanted
or if you

MR. HA~MON: I'd like to brief it, Your Honor, and

6

7

these are the things I'd like to go through in doing that so

8

that the defendant will be satisfied that we've done an

9

adequate job.

I would like to have my secretary make a

10

transcript of this hearing so we have that testimony.

11

would like to get the video recording so that we can review

12

that.

13

to be able to submit a brief on the matter, Your Honor.

14

considering what I think of the time it will take us to get

15

that accomplished, we'd like to have it so that we would

" C:
- 1_,

submit our brief in 30 days.

And then once I have those items,

THE COURT: Okay.

17

•

I

then we would like

Let me ask this.

And

•

Because based

18

or. the informa tion I heard during the testimony,

l9

clear i~ we're looking for a video recording,

2 CJ

recording,

I wasn't

or an audio

•

or both?
Both.

21

D8FF NDANT M:Z\K T TNF:6- CAS'l'ELLANOS:

22

THE C'.JURT: T' m wai t . .:i.n g for the officer to indicate

,.._i -:,

M~.
25

SHESTS: On the camera.

THE COU~T: So it's a video/audio recording?
34
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•

•
•
•
•

1

MR. SHEETS : Yes .

2

THE COURT: On a single tape?

3

MR. SHEETS : Well, I' ll have to -

4

THE COURT: It's a single recording?

5

MR. SHEETS: Yes.

6

THE COURT: You didn't have a mic on your shoulder

7

8
9

•

•
•
•

10
11

We have one of these little mies

on our belt.
THE COURT: So you have - is that in conjunction
with the video camera of the car?
MR. SHEETS: Yes.

Everything's on it .

13

THE COURT: Okay.

So everything is on one tape?

14

MR. SHEETS: Yes.

15

THE COURT: Okay.

16

So the request is, if that tape

can be located -

17

MR. HARMON: Yes.

18

THE COURT: - can it be provided?

19

know from counsel how long it would take to do that?

21

•

MR. SHEETS: No.

12

20

•

that was recording?

22

And I need to

MS. HOWARD: I'm sure they could have it to Mr.
Harmon by Monday.
THE COURT: Okay.

Then I think within 30 days is a

23

reasonable time for Mr. Harmon to provide us with a copy - or

24

of his brief on this matter, his memorandum, and

25

how long would you need after you receive his to reply?

Ms. Howard,

35

•
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1

2

•

----~ - - - - - - - - - - MS. HOWARD: I wouldn't need very long, Your Honor.

If we can have two weeks?

3

THE COURT: That would be fine.

4

Mr. Harmon, if you could have yours prepared and

5

7

Then, Ms. Howard, if we could have yours by
December 15 th , then I can consider the matter after that.

8
9

•

submitted by November 30 th ?

6

•

Is there anything further that we can accomplish on
this case today,

•

counsel?

10

MS. HOWARD: I don't have anything further.

11

MR. HARMON: Yeah.

12

THE COURT: Then let me do this.

•

I think that's I'm going to ask

13

my clerk to pull the file and notify me after November 30 th

14

just so that I can see if we have documents.

15

the case to linger or to be forgotten~

16

our criminal processes, we go from motion filing to

17

evidentiary hearing and then sometimes we don't have a bump

18

date by which to make sure that it comes back up on my

19

calendar.

20

I'm going to call for an oral argument type presentation by

21

counsel some time in December.

22

opportunity to present things in writing.

23

have it by the deadlines established, then I'll simply set a

24

hearing date so that we can have an oral argument and a

25

decision.

I don't want

And unfortunately,

in

•

If we don't have the memorandum by November 30 th ,

I would prefer to give you an
But if we don't
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t

•
•

1

MS. HOWARD: Okay .

2

THE COURT: You need to talk to your attorney, and

3

•
•
•

4

exhibits with you, Your Honor.

6

through the motions hearing?

7

THE COURT: Thank you.

I would.

Ei ther party can

have access to the file if they have questions about what's

9

in the file, and a copy of the transcript should - I mean, a

10

copy of the recording of this hearing shouldn't be any
· problem for either party to get a copy of if they feel they'd
like too .

13
14

Mr. Harmon, is there anything else we need to
address today?

15

MR. HARMON: No, Your Honor .

16

THE COURT: Thank you then.

17

•

If you'd like to have those

8

12

•

MS. HOWARD: I will leave the evidence - the

5

11

•

I'll respond to him.

That'll be the order of

the court.

18

MS. HOWARD: Thank you, Your Honor.

19

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

20

21

•

22
23
24

•

25
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FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
JUAB COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs

NOTICE OF HEARING ON COURT'S
SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION OF
GRANTING DEFENDANT
ANEW TRIAL

ABISAI MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS,

•

•
•
•
•
•

•

Defendant.

Civil No. 101600146
Judge James Brady

This matter came before the court for jury trial on November l, 2012. The jury trial
resulted in a conviction of the defendant on counts 1,2 4, and 5, and the dismissal of count 3 of
the information. One week following the trial, the court met with counsel for both parties in
chambers to notify the parties that the court is concerned with a question of whether any error or
impropriety occurred in this case which may have had a substantial adverse effect on the rights of
the defendant as is contemplated by Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Specifically, expressed concern whether defendant received effective assistance of counsel. This
concern is based solely on the court's own considerations of two events in the history of this
case. 1) Defense counsel's failure to file any memorandum following an evidentiary hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress; and 2) Defense counsel's failure to challenge or remove a
potentially biased juror from the jury on the day of trial.
Without coming to a conclusion on the final issue presented in the motion to suppress, the
court notes that based on the testimony elicited at trial, there is at least an arguable basis to have
pursued defendant's motion to suppress, which defense counsel failed to do .
The court is also concerned that a prospective juror who may have a bias was ultimately
allowed to remain on the jury to hear and decide the case. The court's concern for potential bias
is based on the juror's many years working as a highway patrolman, his prior involvement in
numerous interdiction cases with facts similar to the case being tried, and/or his brief prior
association with the State's only witness who is a current highway patrolman,

:ao

The court sets a hearing on December 20, 2012 at I l
A_.m. at which time it will
hear argument from counsel on the question of whether any error or impropriety occurred in this
case which may have had a substantial adverse effect on the rights of the defendant, as
contemplated by Rule 24 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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Dated this£ day of November, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

~~~Judge James Brady
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION

,

I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 101600146 by the method and on the date
specified.

BY HAND:
BY HAND:

,

JARED W ELDRIDGE
MILTON T HARMON

11/08/2012

/s/ CINDY JACQUART

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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